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The Battle of Chickamauga—Letter from Captain W. N. Polk.

To the Editor of the Southern Historical Society Papers :

SIR,—Will you kindly give a place to the following account of the Chickamauga campaign. It is an extract from a work shortly to be given to the public, "The Life of Leonidas Polk," and as such may possess some historical interest. The occasion of my request is an address upon the Campaign and Battle of Chickamauga, made by Colonel Archer Anderson, in your city, and recently published in your journal. This battle is one about which there has been from the first a great deal of controversy. The close of the war and the dire necessities pressing upon all Confederates, buried such questions for a time, and perhaps it is a mistake to revive them now; but history is being written, and articles such as Colonel Anderson's will exercise no light influence upon the compilers. The paragraphs to which we ask special attention are those that cover the movements of Generals Crittenden and Polk on September 12th and 13th, and those describing the formation of General Bragg's line of battle on September 20th, together with such as dwell upon the efforts made to correct the errors of that formation.

EXTRACT FROM FORTHCOMING MEMOIR OF GENERAL POLK.

In tracing the part taken by General Polk in the battle of Chickamauga, and which of necessity embraces a survey of the battle itself, we are deprived of an official report of the part taken by his corps, as he was transferred to a distant command soon afterward, and unable to secure reports from subordinate commanders. The material left by him, however, with what we have been enabled to procure, will do, as we trust, entire justice to his memory.

It has been already mentioned in the preceding chapter that in consequence of a flank movement on the right, and the threatened danger to its communications towards the last of June, the Army of Tennessee was put in retreat from Shelbyville and Tullahoma on or toward Chattanooga. The retreat was effected with slight or inconsiderable loss in men and transportation, and Chattanooga was occupied during the days of the first week of July. Polk's corps, except Anderson's brigade of Withers's division, which was ordered to Bridgeport, where the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad crosses the Tennessee river, for purposes of observation, was retained in and around Chattanooga, and Hardee's corps was distributed along the line of the Knoxville railroad, with Tyner's station as its centre, General Bragg establishing the army headquarters at Chattanooga. The work of fortifying was begun and prosecuted for some weeks, during which the army seemed to await the development of the enemy's plans.

Beyond reconnoissances in some force at Bridgeport, and at the mouth of Battle creek, the enemy made no demonstration until the 21st of August, when he succeeded in covering the town of Chattanooga with his artillery from the heights overlooking the Tennessee river and the town. This bombardment of our position, which was intended as a demoralizing *coup de main*, had the more pregnant significance of an announcement that the enemy's plans were completed, and were about being put in active operation. The effect of the bombardment was the official evacuation of the place to points beyond range outside, and the withdrawal of stores to points of convenience on the railroad to the rear, and the withdrawal of Anderson's brigade from Bridgeport.

On the 26th, or 27th of August, or some five or six days after the surprise of Chattanooga, Burnside's advance into East Tennessee was announced by the presence of his cavalry in the vicinity of Knoxville, and Major-General Buckner received orders to evacuate Knoxville, and occupy Loudon. In consequence of a demonstration, it is said, by

a portion of Rosecrans's army at Blythe's ferry, on the Tennessee river, opposite the mouth of the Hiwassee, he was ordered to fall back from Loudon to Charleston, and soon after to the vicinity of Chattanooga. Pending these movements above, which were to give East Tennessee to the Federals, not only for occupation, but for coöperation with Rosecrans in his designs upon Chattanooga and the Army of Tennessee, Rosecrans was not idle below. On Tuesday morning, September 1st, citizens living near Caperton's ferry reported that the enemy was crossing the Tennessee river in force at that point (Caperton's ferry); that on Saturday, the 29th August, three days before, a Federal cavalry force had forded the river at some shallows above to the south side, had proceeded down the river to Caperton's, and in conjunction with another force, appearing contemporaneously on the opposite shore, had thrown a pontoon bridge across the river; and that the enemy commenced immediately to cross in force, and had been crossing for three days, Saturday, Sunday and Monday, and were moving across Sand mountain in the direction of Wills's valley and Trenton. This story, regarded at army headquarters as incredible, was soon after confirmed by reports of the occupation of Trenton by the enemy's cavalry, and its advance up the Wills Valley railroad in the direction of Chattanooga as far as Wahatchie, within seven miles, as a covering force to the advance of its infantry columns on Trenton.

In order to understand this movement of Rosecrans, and subsequent operations, a topographical view is necessary.

Chattanooga is situated on the Tennessee river at the mouth of Chattanooga valley—a valley following the course of the Chattanooga creek, and formed by Lookout mountain and Missionary ridge. East of Missionary ridge, and running parallel with it, is another valley—Chickamauga valley—following the course of Chickamauga creek, which, with the Chattanooga creek, discharges its waters into the Tennessee river—the first above and the latter below the town of Chattanooga, and has with it a common source in McLemore's cove, the common head of both valleys, and formed by Lookout mountain on the west, and Pigeon mountain on the east. Wills's valley is a narrow valley lying to the west of Chattanooga, formed by Lookout mountain and Sand mountain, and traversed by a railroad which takes its name from the valley, and which, reaching from the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad where the latter crosses the valley, has its present terminus at Trenton, and future as Tuscaloosa, Alabama. The distance of Bridgeport from Chattanooga is twenty-eight miles, of Caperton's ferry about forty, and of Trenton something over twenty. Ringgold is

eighteen miles from Chattanooga, on the Georgia State road, and Dalton some forty, at the point where the Georgia State road connects with the East Tennessee railroad. Rome is sixty-five miles southwest of Chattanooga on Coosa river, at the point of confluence of the Etowah and Etanalah. The wagon road from Chattanooga to Rome, known as the Lafayette road, crosses Missionary ridge into Chickamauga valley at Roseville, and proceeding in a southwesterly direction, crosses Chickamauga creek eleven miles from Chattanooga, at Lee and Gordon's mills, and passing to the east of Pigeon mountain, goes through Lafayette—distant some twenty-two miles from Chattanooga—and Summerville within twenty-five miles of Rome. From Caperton's ferry there is a road leading over Sand mountain into Wills's valley at Trenton, and from Trenton to Lafayette and Dalton, over Lookout mountain, through Cooper's and Stevens's gaps, into McLemore's cove, and over Pigeon mountain by Dug gap. The road from Trenton, following Will's valley, exposed by easy communications, Rome, and through it Western Georgia and Eastern Alabama, with easy access to the important central positions, Atlanta and Selma.

The General commanding believing a flanking movement to be the purpose of the enemy in his movements on the left, ordered Lieutenant-General Hill on Monday, September 7th, to move with his corps to Lafayette, and General Polk to Lee and Gordon's mill, and Major-General Buckner, with the Army of East Tennessee, and Major-General Walker, with his division from the Army of Mississippi, to concentrate at Lafayette, and Brigadier-General Pegram to cover the railroad with his cavalry. These dispositions having been made of the Confederate forces, Major-General Crittenden, commanding the left wing of Rosecrans's army, which had not moved with the right and centre, but had been left in the Sequatchie valley, crossed the Tennessee river at the mouth of Battle creek, and moved upon Chattanooga. Major-General McCook, commanding the right wing, was thrown forward to threaten Rome, and the corps of Major-General Thomas was put in motion over Lookout mountain, in the direction of Lafayette.

In view of the situation of the enemy, as above given, General Polk suggested to the attention of the Commanding General the opportunity offered of striking Rosecrans in detail. A force was thrown forward into McLemore's cove, but the movement was inadequate, and by no means equal to the magnitude or the consequences suspended on its success. Various causes have been assigned for its failure, but among the best informed it is set down to the score of the limited scale on which it was planned.

Hindman's division had been detached from General Polk's corps, and under direct orders from army headquarters was to make this movement under its supervision. General Polk was assigned a position where he could protect Hindman against Crittenden.

The force approaching the cove was known to be a portion, if not the whole, of Thomas's corps, much the largest in the opposing army.

A reference to General Bragg's official report will show that during the 9th of September it was ascertained a column of the enemy, estimated variously from four thousand to eight thousand strong, had crossed Lookout mountain and reached the cove, by way of Stevens's and Cooper's gaps, this body doubtless being the advance of a corps then known to be opposite the cove, on the other side of the mountain.

Hindman was ordered to move at midnight of the 9th September, and be in position as early as practicable to attack the enemy at the cove. Lieutenant-General D. H. Hill, whose forces were in the direction of Lafayette, was ordered to move at the same time, with Cleburne's division, across Pigeon mountain, by way of Dug's and Colliet's gaps, to unite with Hindman and take charge of the forces. Timber felled by the enemy impeded Hill's march through Dug's gap to such an extent that Buckner was directed, at 8 A. M. on the 10th September, to move Preston's and Stewart's commands to Hindman's support and supply Hill's place. Hindman got into position early on the morning of the 10th. Buckner followed without delay, but owing to the distance was unable to reach Hindman until about half-past 4 o'clock in the afternoon—rather late for the accomplishment of the object in view on that day.

While these movements were going on Negley's division of the opposing forces advanced to within a mile of Dug's gap, Baird's moved up to within supporting distance, leaving Reynold's and Brannan's still to the west of the mountain.

By daylight of the 11th September Cleburne had forced his way through the felled timber of Dug's gap, and was ready to respond to Hindman's attack,* but being uncertain of his position, did not attack, and Negley, realizing the peril of his position, withdrew with Baird, about 10 A. M. to a secure position at the foot and sides of the mountain, and foiled the manœuvre planned by the Commanding General of the Army of Tennessee.

Thomas had escaped, but Crittenden, in the direction of Ringgold,

* General Hindman's reasons for not attacking at daylight are given in his report, now in the archives of the Southern Historical Society.

was isolated. It was believed throughout the army that a prompt movement on the part of General Bragg in the direction of Chattanooga would have intercepted and crushed him. But the attention of the Commanding General was fixed on McCook, who had crossed Lookout mountain to the south of Lafayette, and thrown a column of observation northward to feel for his enemy.

McCook's column of observation having approached Lafayette, gave General Bragg the impression that a heavy force threatened him from that quarter. He therefore concentrated his strength at Lafayette, and Crittenden pursued his way unmolested.

On the morning of the 12th of September the nature of McCook's movement having been ascertained, attention was turned to Crittenden; as the Confederate army was not then pressed by either Thomas or McCook, its prompt movement to Chattanooga was feasible, and would have resulted in his capture. The movement was not made; what was done we shall now mention.

At 10 A. M. on the 12th September General Polk was instructed to proceed with the divisions of Cheatham and Walker, *and take position at Rock Spring*. Hindman's division was to follow as early as practicable.*

Rock Spring, on a road leading from Ringgold to Lafayette, is about twelve miles from Lafayette to the north, about seven from Ringgold, to the southwest, and about four and a half from Gordon's mill to the southeast.† It marks the intersection of roads from Ringgold, Peavine church and Gordon's mill, and it was along these roads that Crittenden was believed to be advancing. Such was General Polk's information from the Commanding General and from the cavalry in his front.

General Polk's orders were to attack at daylight on the 13th September. After having placed Cheatham's and Walker's divisions so as to cover all anticipated approaches, General Polk at 8 P. M. of the same day sent a dispatch to General Bragg, in which he gave a disposition of the forces under him, made a suggestion as to the protection of his left flank, and other details.

Hindman arrived about dawn, his division was at once placed in line, Polk was ready, but there was no enemy; reconnoissances were made without avail on the roads upon which he was expected. Gen-

* This division, marching from its position near Dug's gap, reached Lafayette about dark on the 12th, and started for Rock Spring about 9 the same evening.

† These measurements taken from a map prepared by Major-General Tower to show movements of Federal armies.

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eral Bragg now came upon the field, and the situation was reported to him by General Polk.

A reference to General Crittenden's report of the part taken by his corps in the battle of Chickamauga will show where the opposing forces really were.

Wood had been sent to Gordon's mills on the 11th September. Crittenden, with VanClevess and Palmer's Divisions, on the morning of the 12th of September, moved from Ringgold in a westerly direction, crossed the Chickamauga and marched directly to Gordon's mills, where his corps was concentrated on the evening of the same day (September 12). So that the expected enemy from the direction of Ringgold and Peavine church, which was to be attacked at Rock Spring at daylight on the 13th September, had reached Gordon's mills on the preceding evening, thus placing himself behind the Chickamauga, covering his line of retreat, and securing his communications with Thomas. The Commanding General had ordered Polk's movement just twelve hours late. See Rebel Record, volume 7, page 526.

General Bragg, in his official report of the battle of Chickamauga, charges General Polk with the failure to crush Crittenden's forces in their isolated position at Ringgold. It will be noted, however, that General Polk was ordered to take position at a particular spot—Rock Spring—thence, if not attacked, to advance by daylight of the 13th September, and assume the offensive against the opposing forces which were expected from the direction of Ringgold. But Crittenden was at Gordon's mill behind the Chickamauga on the evening of the 12th September; the order simply was impracticable. There was no enemy, save scouting cavalry, in Polk's front, as General Bragg, who was on the ground at the time, was able to ascertain from personal observation; and the manœuvre failed, not by a fault of a subordinate in neglecting to carry out a specific order, which, being fulfilled, relieved him of responsibility, but the failure was due to the fact that the alertness and celerity of the enemy, although not remarkable in its way, overmatched the movements of the General commanding the Army of Tennessee.

Although these movements on the part of General Bragg to destroy fractions of the enemy's force, were without effect, it might be supposed they would at least serve as warnings to Rosecrans, but the several corps of the army under him were still far apart, and General Bragg was aware of it. In the official report made by General D. H. Hill, of the part taken by his command in the battle of Chickamauga, he mentions that General Bragg stated at a council of officers held on,

the morning of the 14th of September, that McCook was at Alpine, Thomas in McLemore's cove and Crittenden at Lee and Gordon's mills. The Federal right, therefore, was separated from its left by about forty miles, in a straight line, with a mountain of difficult passage intervening. The Confederate force, at the time, could have been thrown upon either corps."

Rosecrans finally seems to have abandoned the vain imaginings with which he had been possessed, that Bragg was in disorderly retreat, and to have awakened to a sense of the peril of his divided and weakened forces against such masses as the Confederates possibly might move against him. He therefore retired Crittenden to the foot of Missionary ridge, and directed McCook to close on Thomas at Stevens's gap. On the 17th of September these three corps were within supporting distance of each other.

Moving up carefully, General Bragg succeeded by the night of the 17th of September in placing the army in position upon the east side of the Chickamauga, its line extending from McLemore's cove on the left to Reed's bridge on the right; its centre, commanded by General Polk, resting about Lee and Gordon's mills. The Federal army lay along the west side of the stream, its corps in easy supporting distance, the right in the cove, its left at Lee and Gordon's mills, while the reserve corps (Granger's) rested at Rossville; reached that point on the 14th, moving from Bridgeport.

In view of the tempting and magnificent opportunity now offered to the Confederate General, with the army of Rosecrans before him, General Polk proposed a strong demonstration he made at Lee and Gordon's mills. Under cover of that feint the remainder of the army should march rapidly by the right flank as far as Reed's bridge and fords near there, and, having crossed Chickamauga creek and valley, should move at right angles to the Lafayette and Chattanooga road, by that means closing the exit of the opposing forces from the valley in the direction of Chattanooga.

The movement could have been met by the Virginia troops now arriving at Ringgold, and would have effectually imprisoned the Federal army in McLemore's cove, barred its communication with Chattanooga, and placed it in the power of the Confederate General.

This movement, which might have been executed on the night of the 17th of September and morning of the 18th, was unquestionably that upon which General Bragg had determined. In making it, however, the crossing was effected at points too near Lee and Gordon's mills—the enemy's left.

By nightfall of the 18th of September General Bragg had placed Hood's and Walker's commands, with Forrest's cavalry, to the west of the creek, covering the bridges and fords by which he intended to cross the remainder of the army on the following day.

Forrest was at Alexander's bridge, Walker half a mile in front of him, Hood in front of Tedford's ford, about nine hundred yards east of the Chattanooga road, while Buckner held Byron's and Thedford's fords. Polk and Hill were opposite Lee and Gordon's and Glass's mills, and during the day had been making demonstrations against the forces at these points in order to cover the movements just noted.

Pending these movements Rosecrans, perceiving Bragg's purpose, shifted his line further down the stream. Retaining Crittenden at Lee and Gordon's mills, he moved McCook near Bond's spring, and Thomas was directed to pass to the rear of Crittenden and take position near Kelly's house, on the Lafayette and Chattanooga road, nearly opposite Reed's bridge (see map 1 of the series).

Thomas succeeded by dawn of the 19th of September in placing Brannan's and Baird's divisions in position.

The ground upon which the shock of arms was imminent is undulating and gradually rising from the stream to the State road from Lafayette to Chattanooga. It was at the time covered in the main with dense undergrowth, interspersed with oak and pine timber, with here and there small cultivated fields.

BATTLE OF THE NINETEENTH.

At dawn on the 19th of September, the Confederate demonstration at Lee and Gordon's mills, and Glass's mill, was resumed with a view of holding the enemy in their position at those points.

In order to complete the left of the Confederate line, Buckner now took position to the left of Hood, Buckner's left resting on the stream some fifteen hundred yards from Lee and Gordon's mills.

Cheatham, who had been detached from General Polk's command during the previous night, crossed Hunt's ford about 7 A. M., and took post in the rear of Walker's position of the day previous, from which Walker had moved to take post on Hood's right.

Forest, under orders direct from army headquarters, moved at dawn with Pegram's division to reconnoitre in the direction of the roads leading west from Reed's bridge, and struck a brigade that had gone out in like observation, under direction of General Thomas. Forrest, with characteristic promptness, attacked the brigade and opened the

battle, unexpectedly to General Bragg, who was under the impression that the enemy's left was at Lee and Gordon's mills, where he had expected to assail and turn it.

But Rosecrans had judiciously thrust his left beyond the Confederate right to an advantageous position, which enabled him not only to cover his line to Chattanooga, but to assault the Confederate right, with the expectation of crushing it in the bed of the Chickamauga.

Thomas was honored with command of this assault, and strove with a will to achieve it. With Brennan's and Baird's Divisions he bore down heavily against Forrest until the latter, who seldom asked for aid, appealed to Walker for relief. Ector's and Wilson's brigades speedily responded, and with this light force the gallant cavalry chief stayed the tide of battle. The check was temporary. Bragg dispatched the remainder of Walker's command to his support. Its timely onset about 11:30 A. M., again placed advantage with the White and Red.

The divisions of Johnston, Palmer and Reynolds now came into Federal line, to the right of Brennan's and Baird's, and pushing against the left flank of Walker whilst he was forcing back the latter two divisions, threatened his capture. Walker skilfully extricated his command from the danger involved, and slowly withdrew it.

It was now about 1 P. M. It appeared Thomas would accomplish his design of driving the Confederate right to the stream. But Cheatham had been ordered to Walker's support. He formed his division to the left and rear of Walker, in two lines, across the road from Alexander's bridge, and moving steadily up to Thomas's exultant divisions, struck their exposed right, and threw them back in disorder.

General Polk, who had remained with Hindman to press the demonstration at Lee and Gordon's mills, received orders at noon to withdraw Hindman's division as early as practicable, move it across the stream, and assume command of the operations in progress on the right. After having issued the necessary orders to Hindman, he rode at once to the scene of conflict, which he reached just as Cheatham was moving forward to the assault we have already mentioned. From a reconnoissance of the position, necessarily brief, he formed the opinion the forces under him were contending with the entire corps of Thomas, and perhaps fractions of other corps. He reported his views to General Bragg, and as Walker had suffered severely, asked that another division might be placed at his disposition.

In the mean while Cheatham had been steadily pressing forward, and Walker having reformed his command was moved to the right, so

as to take position to cover Cheatham's right flank, Forrest covering the extreme right.

The Federal forces, now again in line, surged against Cheatham's front till he was compelled to yield ground. Liddell was now thrown forward on the right of Cheatham, to meet the pressure in that direction.

Stewart's division of Buckner's corps now came upon the ground. Its arrival was opportune. Cheatham's left had been turned by Reynolds, and his entire command was falling back. Lieutenant Richmond, of General Polk's staff, indicated to Stewart his position on Cheatham's left. Moving promptly forward, this division struck Reynolds's and swept it out of the way; continuing forward, it met Van Cleve's division, on its way to the relief of Thomas, and drove it in disorder across the State road.

While Stewart was executing this daring and brilliant advance, Cheatham, in falling back had reached a strong position, where he halted his line, ran forward Lieutenant Turner's battery, and opened so fierce a fire the centre of Thomas's line gave way just as its left had been struck by Liddell. Thomas, now with Stewart on his right, Cheatham in front and Liddell on his left, was compelled to retire. Stewart, after disposing of Van Cleve, pierced Rosecrans's line and moved across the State road some four hundred yards. Nagley and Davis now threatening his rear, made retreat expedient. About sunset he took post about six hundred yards to the east of the road.

Thomas retreated until he reached a position near the State road, where he placed Palmer, Reynold and Brannan, in line, leaving Johnson and Baird well in front as a grand guard.

Cleburne's division reached the portion of the line where this stubborn conflict had been going on about 6 P. M. Though late General Polk determined to put it in position on Cheatham's right and move again upon the enemy. Cleburne and Cheatham were ordered to advance and attack, Walker to move in the rear as a support.

General Polk then turned to Captain Wheelless of his staff and said: "Go to General Bragg and tell him that I feel certain, from the prisoners captured, we have been fighting Rosecrans's entire army. I am now placing Cleburne in position on the right, and will advance in a few moments on the enemy, and expect to drive them before us. Present my compliments to General Bragg, and assure him that I feel confident of success to-morrow.

Cannon and musketry announced a renewal of the persistent conflict. Cheatham's division struck Johnson's and Baird's in front, while Cle-

burne's struck them in front and flank ; and this portion of the Federal line was further driven back, until darkness prevented pursuit.

It was in the latter contest the thorough soldier and courtly gentleman, Brigadier General Preston Smith, lost his life.

On the left of the Confederate line no event of note occurred prior to 2 P. M., when Hood's skirmish line was driven in, and he assumed the aggressive, taking with his own command Trigg's brigade of Preston's division, he moved across the State road, driving the enemy's forces in his front. He soon encountered Wood's division and a portion of Sheridan's on his left and rear, and the divisions of Negley and Davis in front, which compelled him to withdraw his troops some six hundred yards east of the road where they were posted for the night.

This conflict, though not so prolonged as that on the right, was fierce while it lasted, and the loss comparatively heavy.

Preston's remaining brigades, not being ordered into action, held their position near the Chickamunga, covering the extreme left.

As the result of the day's fighting General Bragg had effected a crossing, established his line, and had inflicted a heavy loss on the enemy, forcing them to stand upon the defensive.

On the left Hood bivouaced on a prolongation of the line of the morning, some six hundred yards to the right. The contest of the day on this part of the field had been made by 8,219 Confederate infantry and artillery against 15,618 Federals, together with a brigade of mounted infantry.

On the right the forces opposed to Polk had been defeated and driven back to their position of the morning. By 5 P. M. Thomas had abandoned his aggressive movement against the Confederate right and had retired to within 500 yards of the Chattanooga (State) road, leaving Baird and Johnson well in advance as a grand guard to hold the battle-field, if possible, for the night. They also quickly retired to the State road, when, attacked by Cleburne and Cheatham at 6 P. M., these two divisions bivouaced in advance of the position abandoned by Baird and Johnson.

The contest of the day had been made on this part of the field by 16,573 Confederate infantry and artillery against 30,247 Federal, the fruits of which were reaped by sending forward Cleburne's division of 5,115 infantry ; making a total infantry and artillery force on the Confederate right, after 6 P. M., of 21,728.

*The arrangement of the forces, the number engaged, and the losses we now give.**

CONFEDERATE.

Right wing, Lieutenant-General Polk:

Walker's corps.....	5,175
Cheatham's division.....	7,000
Stewart's "	4,398
Cleburne's "	5,115
Total infantry and artillery.....	21,688
Cavalry.....	2,000
Total.....	23,688
Loss about.....	4,000

Confederate left wing, Major-General Hood:

Johnson's division.....	3,683
Laws's " about	3,000
Trigg's brigade.....	1,536
Total infantry and artillery.....	8,219
Loss about.....	2,000

In reserve, not engaged, 2 brigade's, Preston's..... 3,270

Right wing:

Hill's { Breckinridge.....	3,769
corps. { Cleburne	4,670
Walker's { Liddell }	
corps. { Gist†.... }	4,355

* The estimate of the Confederate forces is made from the Official Reports of the Corps, Division and Brigade Commanders. That of the Federal from morning reports made September 10th and September 20th, 1863. Copies of which were kindly furnished by General Marcus J. Wright, War Records Office.

† Gist's Brigade arrived about 10 A. M.—20th.

Cheatham.....	6,000
Total.....	18,814
Cavalry, (Forrest's).....	3,500
Aggregate.....	22,314

Of the infantry of this wing 4,749 were fresh troops.

Left wing:

Buckner's { Preston	4,078
corps. { Stewart	3,750
Hindman's division.....	6,100

Hood's { Johnson	
corps. { Law	
{ Kershaw	

Total.....*22,849

Cavalry (Wheeler's)..... 4,000

Aggregate..... 26,849

Of the infantry of this wing 10,900 were fresh troops.

Total Confederate force, 49,162. 150 pieces of artillery.

FEDERAL.

Left wing, Major-General Thomas:

Brannan's division.....	5,989
Baird's "	4,655
Johnson's "	4,184
Palmer's "	4,853
Reynolds's "	6,268
Van Cleve, two brigades.....	2,300

Total infantry..... 28,247

Artillery about..... 2,000

Total, about..... 30,247

Loss..... 7,701

* Longstreet's Report, page 375, vol. X, Rebellion Record.

Federal right:

Wood's division.....	4,125
Barnes's brigade about.....	1,800
Davis's division.....	2,971
Negley's ".....	4,349
One brigade, Sheridan's division.....	1,373
Total infantry.....	14,618
Artillery about.....	1,000
Wilder's brigade—mounted infantry.....	0,000

Two brigades of Preston's division, all of Breckenridge's and Hindman's, being eight brigades, forming an aggregate of 13,142 strong, were unengaged on the 19th. As to the enemy's force engaged on that day, Rosecrans, in his official report of the battle, says, "The reserve corps covered the approaches from the Chickamanga towards Rossville, and the extension of our left, and the fact, that at the close of day, we had present but two brigades which had not been opportunely and squarely in action, opposed to superior numbers of the enemy, assured us that we were greatly outnumbered, and that the battle of the next day must be for the safety of the army, and the possession of Chata-nooga."

Crittenden, in the official report of the part taken by the corps under him, attests, "the enemy appeared to have troops enough to fight us everywhere, and to fill up every interval."

This was generous and effective testimony to the intrepidity of the Confederate soldiers and the skill of their commanders.

At the close of the day, General Polk gave orders for the adjustment of his line, and directed his headquarters to be established at Alexander's bridge, about 1,200 yards in rear of his line, as the bridge was well-known and accessible from all parts of the field.

About 9 P. M. he rode to army headquarters to report the operations of the command under him during the day.

After the report was made, a conversation ensued between General Bragg and himself on the disposition of the various commands for the morrow. General Bragg announced that the army would be divided into two wings, the right wing to be under General Polk and the left wing to be under General Longstreet.

The distribution completed, verbal instructions were given General Polk to open the attack at daylight by the division (Breckenridge's)

on the extreme right, from which the attack was to be taken up, by divisions, successively, to the left. It was designed to attempt to turn the enemy's left, and force him into McLemore's cove.

During this interview General Polk suggested a larger force than that allowed should be massed upon the right. He called General Bragg's attention to the inference from the day's fighting—that Rosecrans was accumulating his forces in front of the right wing of the Confederate line. General Polk further mentioned the fact that Granger's corps was a short distance from Rosecrans's left (four and a half miles) in a position to assail in flank and rear any force that might succeed in turning the Federal left. But the Commanding General held to the opinion the bulk of the enemy were nearer Lee & Gordon's mills than General Polk supposed.

General Polk returned direct to his quarters at Alexander's bridge. On the way he met and was accompanied by General Breckenridge, who reported his division as lying near the bridge. As his men had just come from the extreme left and were much fatigued, General Polk on his request consented that they should rest in an open field, just west of the bridge, but directed him to be in line at dawn. He then invited General Breckenridge to bivouac with him. * * *

Immediately on reaching his quarters General Polk issued the following order:

"HEAD-QUARTERS RIGHT WING A. T.,
 "(Near Alexander's Bridge),
 "September 19, 1863, 11:30 P. M.

"CIRCULAR.

"1st. Lieutenant-General Hill, on the right, will attack the enemy with his corps to-morrow morning at day-light.

"2d. Major General Cheatham, on Hill's left, will make a simultaneous attack.

"3d. Major-General Walker's corps will act as reserve.

"Corps and Division commanders will see that their troops are amply supplied with ammunition before daylight.

"By command of

"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL POLK,

"THOS. M. JACK, A. A. General.

"To Lieutenant-General D. H. Hill, Major-General Cheatham, Major-General Walker."

* * * * *

The orders issued, Generals Polk and Breckenridge talked over the plans of the coming day for some time, and then threw themselves upon the ground for a short sleep.

During the same evening Rosecrans assembled his corps commanders and gave them orders for the following day.

Thomas was to hold the position to which he had retired, about five hundred yards east of the State road, his command to form in three lines, placing Baird's division on the extreme Federal left, next to Baird's, successively on the right the divisions of Johnston, Palmer and Reynolds. Brennan's division was to be posted in reserve to the right and rear of Reynolds's.

Negley's division was to take post on the right of Reynolds's; next on the right was McCook, with the divisions of Davis and Sheridan. Wilder's mounted infantry formed the extreme right. This portion of the line was west of the State road.

Crittenden, with his remaining two divisions, VanCleve and Wood, was to take position in the rear of Thomas's and McCook's Corps, so as to be able to support either.

These commanders, as soon as posted, commenced to throw up temporary breastworks. It was understood the left of the line was to be held at all hazards, as the safety of the army depended upon it. General Rosecrans states in substance that if necessary every command should be moved from the right to the left.

It will be noted from this arrangement of the Federal line, General Polk was correct in the views expressed to General Bragg, which we have alluded to, that the bulk of the enemy's forces were massed under Thomas, opposite the Confederate right.

On September 20th the forces under Rosecrans consisted of—

McCook's Corps (Twentieth)	* 10,640
Thomas's Corps (Fourteenth).....	14,524
Crittenden's Corps (Twenty-first).....	13,539
Granger's Reserve (Steadman's Division).....	5,171
Cavalry (Mitchel's Corps).....	9,676
Forming a total of.....	53,550

The Federal line had 170 pieces of artillery.

The disposition made by the Confederate Generals were as follows:

Both wings were to occupy substantially the lines held at the close of

*Taken from morning report, September 20, '63, a copy of which was kindly furnished by General M. J. Wright.

the day's engagement. The left wing some five or six hundred yards from the State road, and about parallel to it. The right wing was to the right and rear, about twelve hundred yards from the road. The general direction of its line being also parallel to the State road. It was necessary for this wing to cover the space between Cheatham's right and the road leading from Reed's bridge to the State road, and in order to accomplish this, fully half its line had to be placed in single formation. Breckenridge's division was in one line on the extreme right; Forrest's cavalry on its flank; Cleburne in one line next to Breckenridge's; Cheatham, with four brigades, in front—one in reserve was on the left; Walker's division (4,500)* corps was in reserve in the rear of Cleburne and Cheatham, so as to support either. General Polk expected to make a heavy pressure in front with Cheatham's, Cleburne's and Walker's divisions, while Breckenridge with Forrest operated on the left flank of the enemy.

During the night General Longstreet had arrived and assumed command of the left wing; at dawn he commenced the arrangement of his line; Hindman's division was placed on the extreme left; Wheeler's cavalry on the flank; Johnston's division was next to Hindman's, and Stewart's on the right of Johnston's. Each division had two brigades in front and one in the rear. Preston's division was placed in reserve on the left; Law's division in the rear of Johnston's. The brigades of Kershaw and Humphries, of McLaw's division, commanded by Kershaw, were posted in rear of Law.

Johnston's, Law's and Kershaw's commands were under Hood, and formed a column of eight brigades, arranged four lines deep. This General Longstreet intended as his principal column of attack.

General Longstreet having understood a gap existed between the wings of the army, had at the beginning of his formation moved Stewart's division some five hundred or six hundred yards to the right. This movement placed Stewart's division directly in front of Cheatham's line and in advance of his skirmishers.

The Commanding General did not advise General Polk of the change of Stewart's division, although they were together after the disposition was made.†

If the change had been made known there was ample time, prior to the attack, to move Walker's corps and Cheatham's division to the right and in rear of the divisions of Cleburne and Breckenridge, and by that

* Gist did not report till about 10 A. M., the 20th.

† There was a thick woods between the two commands.

means have given to the right wing the strength it needed, by a double formation from right to left.

As both lines now stood in array Granger held post four and a half miles to Polk's right, Thomas with Baird's, Johnston's, Palmer's and a part of Reynold's divisions, each division in three lines, and behind breastworks, was opposed to Hill with the divisions of Cleburne and Breckenridge, and a part of Walker's corps.

The remainder of Reynold's division with Brannan's in echelon was in front of Stewart's and Cheatham's divisions and the remainder of Walker's corps.

Negley's, with Wood's and Van Cleve's divisions in reserve, under Crittenden, was in front of Hood's corps.

The divisions of Davis and Sheridan, and Wilder's brigade of mounted infantry under McCook were in front of Hindman's division.

About the time the action began Negley's division was withdrawn from its position, and moved to the rear of Thomas's corps, as a support to the left, Wood's division moving forward and taking Negley's place in the line between Reynold's and Davis's division. The entire Federal line was covered by temporary breastworks.

We have seen that at 11:30 P. M. of the 19th, orders were issued to Hill, Cheatham, and Walker to begin the attack at daylight. The copies destined for Cheatham and Walker were promptly delivered; those for General Hill did not reach him till about sunrise. Every effort was made, but the country, thickly wooded, was cut up with innumerable roads. The moving trains of 50,000 men and the darkness added to the confusion—hence the delay.

A further delay was made by General Hill in order that his men might be fed, many having been without food for twenty-four hours. As an illustration of the loose manner in which the Commanding General made preparations for the battle of the 20th, it may be said that General's Polk's orders were verbal, while General Hill, an officer of equal grade with General Polk, commanding the companion corps of the army, and with headquarters at Thedford's ford, quite near army headquarters, never received a word or line from General Bragg to indicate that he was to report to General Polk for instructions.

The resting of the responsibility for finding and instructing Hill on such a night, upon an officer having no communication with him and without definite information as to his whereabouts, will go far toward accounting for the delay in transmitting the orders. And General Bragg, with that promptness which characterized him in such matters, lost no time in placing the whole of it upon General Polk. It is also

interesting to note that notwithstanding the delay on the right, the Confederate Commander did not have his left ready for action until the assault of the right was commenced, and then, as we will see, so placed as to throw six brigades out of the line in which they were most needed.

BATTLE OF THE TWENTIETH.

It was now 9:30 A. M. General Hill reported his corps ready. The order to advance was given, when Cheatham reported the relation of his line to Stewart's already alluded to. General Polk took prompt measures to repair the grave error by directing Cheatham to halt. He then dispatched information to Cleburne of Stewart's position, and moved Walker by the right oblique, so as to support Hill in the advance. But Hill, already on the move, struck the enemy before Walker could reach him. Cheatham was directed by General Bragg to remain as he was, to act as a reserve.

In the advance Deshler's, and larger part of Wood's, brigades, of of Cleburne's Division, more than half over-lapped Stewart's division on its rear, therefore could not take part in the assault. L. E. Polk's* brigade, and Lowry's regiment, of Wood's brigade, struck the works of the enemy squarely in front, but were too weak to force them. Polk, unable to advance his brigade, determined not to retreat, ordered the command to lie down and hold their position, which was about one hundred and seventy-five yards from the enemy's works. Helm's brigade, of Breckenridge's division, struck the left flank of the works. After two desperate and unavailing efforts to carry them, it was compelled to retire, but not until its leader sealed his devotion, with his life, to the grand old cause of right.

Stovall's and Adams's, the remaining brigades of Breckenridge's division, passed clear of the work, to the State road in the rear, and bore down on the left flank and rear of the enemy.

While Breckenridge was executing this bold movement, General Bragg held Cheatham's division to its position. If it could have been thrown forward to the right in aid of Cleburne, at this opportune moment, the enemy might have been so pressed in front as to have compelled him to keep his troops in position. As it was, he was able to withdraw a portion of his reserve, which, strengthened by brigades from Brannan's and Negley's divisions, operated against Stovall's and Adams's brigades, and forced them back. In this contest, Brigadier-General Adams

* A nephew of Lieutenant-General Polk.

marked with the scars of Shiloh, Penysville and Murfreesboro, was again wounded, and fell into the enemy's hands.

General Bragg, impressed with the necessity of the occasion, detached Jackson's brigade of Cheatham's division, and ordered its commander to report to General Hill, but the support was too feeble to do material service.

Hill had four brigades and a regiment in this attack against four divisions of the enemy, three of which were entrenched. The assault was fierce, and, though repelled, bore its fruits; for, as will be seen, it broke up the formation of the enemy's right.

Meanwhile Walker getting well to the right was advancing to the front. Cleburne was engaged in extricating Deshler, in order to bring him to Polk's support. Helm had fallen and his brigade repulsed. Breckenridge, with Stoval and Adams, was yet far to the front fighting in the enemy's rear. There was thus a gap of several hundred yards between the divisions of Hill's corps. The enemy showing every disposition to fill it, imperiling Breckenridge's position, Walker had to be thrown in at once. Gist, changing direction to the left, moved against Baird's retired flank. Govan, gaining ground to the front and left, advanced as a support to the right of Gist, while Walthal, moving to the left, endeavored to fill the interval between Gist and Cleburne, but the undergrowth was so thick, his own, as well as the movements of the troops on his right, were executed with great difficulty. Before he could get into position his left was assailed so fiercely the entire brigade had to be retired. The division under Gist was repulsed. The gallant Colquit, of the Fourth Georgia, falling in the assault, and Govan, isolated on the extreme right, had to be withdrawn.

Though no advantage had been gained the pressing danger had been averted. The loss commensurate with the effort included many gallant officers, among them the brave and efficient General Deshler. In the interval between these assaults of Breckenridge and Walker the enemy had heavily reinforced their left, extending the line to the left and rear, some distance to the west of the State road.

Prior to this assault, General Polk hearing of Cleburne's repulse, directed General Hill to assume control of the movements on the extreme right, and then rode to his left. Inspecting Cleburne's division, he found his line withdrawn about three hundred yards, readjusted, and in a strong position.

Cleburne having suffered materially in the repulse, General Polk ordered Cheatham to replace him, when a message from General Forrest was received announcing the advance of Granger's corps. This

force of the enemy, as has been said, was holding a position some four-and-a-half miles to the extreme left of the enemy's line when the action began. At 11 A. M. it started to the support of Thomas's corps.

Feeling the importance of protecting the Confederate right against this counter flank movement of the enemy, General Polk ordered Cleburne to hold his position, and directed Cheatham to move to the right with his division, to meet the movement of Granger, but Granger, making a detour to the west of the State road, moved to the rear of Thomas's line, having previously posted a brigade to observe the Confederate right.

It was now 2 P. M. Granger having ceased threatening his flank, General Polk readjusted his line from left to right preparatory to another assault. The enemy's works being visible through the open woods in front of Cleburne, that officer was directed, about 3 P. M., to mass his artillery, and open fire upon the enemy introductory to the advance. Promptly moving his guns to within two hundred yards of the enemy's lines a destructive fire was opened upon them.

Soon after the attack by the right wing, General Longstreet had completed the arrangement of his line, and stood prepared to take up the contest as it reached him from the right, but the repulse of the right deranged the plan of battle. Owing to the advanced position of the enemy's left, Cleburne could move no further forward than on a line with Stewart's division on the right of the left wing, and as the orders were for the divisions on the left to move only in connection with the divisions next on the right, and as Stewart did not move in consequence of the operations of the right wing, the remainder of the left wing remained passive.

Perceiving the right wing unable to advance, Longstreet sought permission to move directly upon the enemy in his front. The Commanding-General, however, had already seen the necessity of the movement, and accordingly orders to that effect had been sent directly to the division commanders.

Stewart, with a portion of Wood's brigade of Cleburne's division, was the first to advance, but encountering a terrific front and flank fire from Reynolds, whose line was retired to the rear and right, he was compelled to fall back after several gallant efforts, aided by Wood, to force the position.

Hood's corps, next on the left, was more fortunate.

Hill's assault in the morning had so impressed Thomas, he called repeatedly upon Rosecrans for aid. Negley's division had been taken from the right and sent to him. Van Cleve's division was ordered to

follow. Sheridan was ordered to go with two brigades, and was executing the order when Hindman's division compelled him to confront it. There remained, to oppose the forces under Longstreet, Wood's division, Van Cleve, a portion of Brannan's, Davis's and Sheridan's, and Wilder's brigade of mounted infantry.

With a view to make his line compact, Rosecrans had directed Wood to close to the left on Reynold's, McCook being ordered to follow the movement. Wood, misunderstanding the order, withdrew from the line, and passed to the rear of Brannan, whose force was in echelon to the right and rear of Reynold's division. The movement of Wood left a gap of a division front on the Federal right. It was noted as soon as made, and Hood's quadruple line filled it. The rear of Wood's division and the right of Brannan's were driven in confusion to the right, Davis was thrust in like disorder to the left; Hindman attacked Sheridan and Wilder in front. The entire Federal right was routed, one of Van Cleve's brigades was captured entire. Sheridan's division, two brigades of Davis's division, and Rosecrans disappeared from the field.

The triumph achieved by Hood was marred by the serious wounding of this daring commander. He had to suffer the amputation of a leg upon the field.

Upon the disappearance of Rosecrans, the command of the Federal line, now shorn of six brigades, devolved upon Thomas. He withdrew Reynold's right, and posted Wood, and two brigades of Negley's divisions to the right, at about right angles to his front line. Brannan was placed next on the right, and west of the State road, and later, Granger on the extreme right; so that his left and right were now at right angles to each other. The position was advantageous. The original line on his left, as already stated, was well fortified. The right was now posted upon the high ground of the foot hills of Missionary Ridge.

Longstreet, without opponent in front, now wheeled his entire line to the right, and moved to assault the enemy's new position, on the foot hills of Missionary Ridge. Buckner massed several batteries upon the State road, and opened an enfilading fire upon the angle of the enemy's line, while Preston's division assailed Brannan's position, and the line to Brannan's left.

While these movements on the left were taking shape, General Polk prepared for a renewal of the assault on the right. As already said Cleburne at 3 P. M. was ordered to mass his batteries, move close up and open fire on the enemy. This was promptly done. A point within 200 yards of their line having been secured, a continuous and destructive fire was kept up.

At 3:30 P. M. General Hill was ordered to attack Cheatham and Walker, being directed to move at the same time. Some delay was occasioned by the difficulty which General Hill met with in getting Jackson's brigade into position on Cleburne's right, so that it was after four when the movement began. The batteries having opened the way the troops moved up with a will, Cleburne on the left, then Breckenridge and Walker, followed by Cheatham, the whole covered by Forrest on the extreme right.

Brigadier-General Polk's brigade leading the line dashed at the works, and after an heroic effort, seized the portion that had opposed such stubborn and successful resistance to Helm, Walthall and Gist earlier in the day, capturing a large number of the enemy.

Longstreet now put forth his full strength, as the cheering yells of successful battle came from the right, Hindman, Buckner, Hood, Stewart all moved forward for a final and triumphant struggle.

Both wings now moved simultaneously. The entire line swept forward in one mighty and resistless surge. Vain the determination that attempted to stay the human tide. The enemy, who had given every proof of valor and endurance the day previous, as well as in the morning, were compelled to retreat hurriedly, striking Liddell a parting blow as they disappeared with the sinking sun. Night interposing the victorious Confederates went into bivouac on the field wrested from the enemy.

The immediate results of the victory were several stands colors, 8,000 prisoners, 51 pieces of artillery, 15,000 stand of small arms, a number of wagons and ambulances, and a quantity of ammunition, hospital stores, &c. * * * * *

In studying the details of this, the greatest battle of the West, one is struck with the singular coincidence that while both commanders showed great activity in putting their armies into battle on the 19th, neither impressed himself upon the action of the 20th. General Bragg in the main satisfied himself with issuing orders from the neighborhood of Alexander's bridge, and there was an evident lack of confidence in his ability to grasp and direct the rapidly shifting events of the battle suggesting disaster where all else pointed to success.

Rosecrans disappeared from the field by noon, leaving his army, shorn of six brigades in the hands of Thomas. Friend and foe alike must give to this officer, all praise for the masterly manner in which he continued the battle. Hard pressed along his entire line he rode to the right in search of aid, when suddenly he found there was no right. In its place were Longstreet's victorious divisions. To a man of less

nerve and resources a more trying situation can scarcely be pictured. Promptly shortening his line he proceeded to form a right from reserves remaining. Placing it at right angles to his front he prepared for a stubborn contest.

There was no time to intrench ; unlike the left, here all that could be done must be done in the open field, and that it was well done is clearly shown, for in the face of disaster, with eight brigades and portions of two others, he held at bay twelve brigades flushed with victory and directed by the most accomplished corps commander in the Confederate army, till the left of his army being from their position by the Confederate right rendered further resistance impossible.

CONCLUSION.

With this, Mr. Editor, we bring our extract to its close. For our authorities we beg to refer to the reports of the two armies, army, corps, division, brigade and regimental ; and also to certain papers on file in the War Records office, Washington. The more personal parts of the sketch are from notes prepared by General Polk. We trust the article may be read carefully, as we wish candid and sincere criticism.

Yours truly,

W. N. POLK.

The True Story of Andersonville Told by a Federal Prisoner

By EDWARD WELLINGTON BOATE.

[In our discussion of the "Treatment of Prisoners" we introduced the testimony of a number of Federal prisoners to refute the wholesale slanders against us, which had been published in every form and scattered over the world. We have recently met with the following, which is No. 6 of a series of articles which Mr. Boate published in the *New York News* in July, 1865. We regret that we have not the full series, for, from this specimen, we are satisfied they would all be valuable additions to our large collection of material. But the paper we give below (coming from a man who was twelve months a prisoner, who was in position to know whereof he affirms, who was a member of the commission sent to Washington by the prisoners to endeavor to effect an exchange, and who published his statements at a time when he had to

face great obliquity to do so) will be found of great interest as well as valuable testimony on points we made in the discussion :]

The bread was badly baked, the bakery being run night and day; the ten thousand prisoners—the number originally intended to be confined at Andersonville—having risen to thirty-eight thousand, and, in addition to the fact that many of our men engaged in the bakery had very little sympathy with the poor men in the stockade, and took as little trouble with their work as possible, they were themselves overtasked. Hence the bread was badly baked. Besides, our men were not used to corn bread, a fact which used to make the Georgians wonder, as they grew fat on corn bred, just as the healthiest and most able-bodied Irishman you could meet at a fair was a man whose principal food was potatoes.

The water was diarrhoeal—a fact which was as injurious to the health of the Confederate authorities in that locality as to our men. But this difficulty was partially obviated by the digging of innumerable wells in various parts of the prison, and excellent water obtained, which the well diggers monopolized and sold for a cent a glass to those who had no claim on the wells.

But our men were great sufferers, and deaths were alarmingly on the increase. The Confederate doctors were, as I have already said, themselves startled and alarmed at the progress of disease and death. But they seemed powerless to check it. I can honestly say—and every man who was connected with the hospital department will bear me out—that the twenty-five or thirty Confederate surgeons who were in attendance at the hospital and in the stockade, acted with as much humanity toward the prisoners as the disheartening circumstances would permit. We were often a fortnight without being able to get medicine. They had no quinine for fever and ague; they had no opium for diarrhoea and dysentery. Our government made medicine a contraband of war, and wherever they found medicine on a blockade runner, it was confiscated, a policy which indicated, on the part of our rulers, both ignorance and barbaric cruelty; for, although no amount of medicine would save many of our men who have laid their bones in Georgia, I am as certain as I am of my own existence, that hundreds of men died, who, if we had had the right sort and proper quantity of medicine, would have been living to-day and restored to their families.

Scurvy was another disease which was making formidable inroads upon the health of the prisoners, but vegetables could not be had for love or money, although for miles the country was scoured, and I knew

Chief Surgeon White to pay from a hundred to two hundred dollars for a quantity of squashes, collards, onions and other garden stuff which could have been purchased in Fulton or Washington market for five or six dollars; although a "greenback" in Andersonville rated at only four times the value of a Confederate dollar—at Richmond it was rated at ten and twelve Confederate dollars. These vegetables were necessarily, from their limited quantity, confined to the hospital. In addition to this the hospital was supplied with eggs, no doubt in limited quantities. [Three dollars in greenbacks for a dozen of eggs.] Fresh beef was supplied to the hospital two or three times a week, and sometimes to the stockade, when it could be had, cattle having for this purpose been sought for miles around the country.

The hospital and sick men in the stockade were supplied with whiskey, three and four barrels having been some days brought into headquarters, and regular details of our own men appointed to distribute it, who, however, often drank the rations themselves. The hospital was supplied with tea and sugar, not abundantly to be sure, but hospitals, even in New York city, are not over-abundantly supplied with such articles.

Nevertheless, great misery prevailed in the stockade. But it was inevitable from the circumstances. The men, two out of every three, had no change of underclothing, and although there was water enough to wash them, they could not get soap, an article of which the Confederate authorities were themselves especially in need. The bodies of our men, and indeed the minds, had become prostrated from long confinement, in many instances sixteen and twenty months. There were gathered into one prison, by the force of events, nearly forty thousand men, to be provided with food, and five thousand with medicine. They were deprived of their accustomed food, and had to live upon the same kind of rations, day after day, nearly the whole of the time. But none, except those who have gone through the mill, know what a tremendous task it is to provide daily rations for such a vast multitude of human beings.

There are some special facts I wish to state of my own knowledge, as they will throw some light on this unhappy subject. It has been stated over and over, and reiterated in a thousand different shapes, that the Confederate authorities meant to starve our men. But I, who was twelve months a prisoner of war, and suffered sickness, and cold, and hunger, in common with the other prisoners, deny this flatly, for, while we all suffered, there was no desire to inflict suffering or hardship upon Federal prisoners. Why, the Confederate authorities were suffering

many a privation at Andersonville. The surgeons who were in attendance upon the sick had not decent shoes or stockings; their shoes and boots being in many instances so patched, that the original leather out of which they had been manufactured had become invisible. These gentlemen, men of education and professional ability, and who were reared in luxury, did not know often—while giving their services daily and nightly to such a host of prisoners—where to look for a dinner or a bed. During the six months I was in Andersonville, not one of them received a dollar's pay. The consequence was, that they had been turned out of their boarding houses in the adjacent villages and country houses, and Dr. White, head surgeon, had to provide quarters for them as best he might. These surgeons had often to share the tents of the paroled Federal prisoners. Dr. White himself was often glad to get even a share of the prison rations—corn bread and ham—while engaged in his official and professional duties; often for fourteen or fifteen hours without intermission. He was an able surgeon, humane, enlightened, abstemious and self-denying, and had all the high-souled chivalry and deportment of the best of the F. F. V's.

In this connection, let me refer to Captain Wirz, the Commandant of the prison, who was generally regarded as being very harsh. But his position should be considered. He was a mere keeper of prisoners—a work which can never be popular. The Yankees were nightly and indeed daily trying to run away, as they were bound to do; but he said he was bound to catch them wherever he could find them. Between the jailer and the jailed, there could not and never can be any peculiar love; but, under a rough exterior, more often assumed than felt, this Captain Wirz was as kind-hearted a man as I ever met. Being myself at headquarters I learned his character, and the opinion I formed of him when in the stockade, which was one of a bitter kind enough, I had to change when I came really to know the man. The first collision between Captain Wirz and his prisoners was, when on the 17th of March he wanted to squad them off, for the purpose of exactly ascertaining the number of rations that would be needed at that date, the men wanted to play a flank movement, so as to get counted in two squads, and thereby get double rations. Half the prisoners were placed at the south side of the "swamp," the other at the north side. When the Confederate sergeants counted the squads at the north side, and dismissed each squad as counted and named, hundreds of them dodged across the "swamp" and got into the southern side squads by the time the sergeants were able to get across, in order to get double rations, giving different names to those they went by at the other side. But the number of prisoners

sent into the stockade had been kept carefully at headquarters, and it was found that some two thousand had attempted the "flank movement," that is some two thousand more rations were returned on the count in the prison than could be accounted for. The trick was discovered, and as it was perpetrated on the north side the captain stopped their rations that day, but gave them to the south side of the prison.

This caused bad blood between the north side and the captain. The men groaned him when he entered, and henceforth there was an intermittent feud; but the men who attempted this trick ought to have known and done better. In quantity the rations were double, whatever other drawbacks there might have been.

Every night men worked at the tunneling from under some tent, out, under and at the other side of the stockade; but there was always some traitor in camp who informed on the "conspirators," just as the tunnel was completed. When discovered, the captain would ride in at the head of his guards and march to the exact spot where the tunnel was to be found. But, although nightly discovered, the men worked like beavers at "tunneling" in some other part of the camp; but I do not believe that a single one of those tunnels ever proved successful. The captain was thus kept in hot water, and being a man of a by no means mild temper, he often cursed and damned, but that was all.

Men were, however, nightly making their escape over the stockade, by bribing the guards, and by other dodges; and, though they often had a five hours' start, the hounds being sent in pursuit, they were almost invariably overtaken and brought back, when they were for some days put in ball and chain, and sent back to the stockade; but they were no sooner inside than they managed to file off the ball and chain, only appearing in their (sham) pedal bracelets every morning during the counting of the men by the Confederate sergeants. As an evidence that Wirz was actuated by no desire to inflict hardship upon our men, I heard him often exclaim, when a new batch of some five or six hundred prisoners would come: "I would as soon send these unfortunate men into h—l as into that d—d bull pen. It sickens me."

The men often arrived at the prison without a blanket or any sort of "kit;" and in they marched and had to make their lodging on the cold ground. At this time every branch and leaf for miles around had been cut down to make tents; and men had, when permitted to haul firewood, to go several miles around the country under guard. It often happened, by the by, that on these occasions the Federal soldiers would, when a sufficient distance from the stockade, lay hands on the guard, "buck and gag" him, take away his gun, and make their escape.

Many of the men were suffering sadly for want of tents to keep them from the fierce rays of the sun and the equally fierce rain which often fell for ten or twelve hours together. It will here be asked, as it has often been asked before, "Why did not the Confederate authorities at Andersonville give our men wooden huts in a woody country?" This question has been often asked, and never answered. Yet it can be fairly, if not quite satisfactorily, explained.

Day after day in May and June the papers were bringing us authentic reports that exchange was at hand. Exchange became a fixed fact for some time. The commissioners had met at City Point, and General Grant had gone to Fortress Monroe, and the basis of exchange, as arranged by the commissioners, had been approved by the Lieutenant-General. But disappointment was sure to follow, and no exchange was visible. At one period, during a long interval of disappointment, I saw a plan drawn up at headquarters for the erection of wooden barracks, so ingenious and comprehensive that 40,000 men could be conveniently housed in prison; and the work was commenced to be cut down for the purpose. In mid-career an official report reached headquarters that exchange would be commenced in ten days from date, and wood-cutting was given up as superfluous. In a few weeks, toward the close of July, General Stoneman's raid at Macon took place, and the Confederates immediately commenced, with their available help of niggers, to fortify Andersonville, which they certainly believed was to be immediately attacked. At this very period Dr. White, who had started for Macon to hurry up medicine, was stopped at Fort Valley, half-way between Andersonville and Macon; and, instead of coming back with medicine, came to his office armed to the teeth, announcing to the surgeons that they must help to defend the place, according to the instructions of General Winder, as the prison was to be immediately attacked. We, Federal paroled prisoners, it was announced, were to be sent down to the hospital. The cannon planted around headquarters, which dominated the prison, were charged and manned, and everything ready for defense. During the previous week of rumors of attack, huge breast-works were thrown up by niggers who labored at them night as well as day. Stoneman was, however, himself captured, and the excitement passed away. Thoughts of changing the location of the prison occupied the minds of the authorities, as they did not know what moment the prison would be attacked and the prisoners carried off. Confusion, apprehension and dread filled the minds of the Andersonville officers.

Things, however, soon calmed down. A few weeks previously, a great movement had taken place in the prison. The great paramount

idea of the prisoners was exchange. They accordingly called a great meeting, and after some preliminary proceedings, resolutions, and a memorial to President Lincoln, were adopted, asking, in view of the suffering and mortality of our men, that he should agree to an exchange of prisoners, as the Confederates were willing to exchange man for man, and officer for officer, leaving the excess of prisoners at which ever side found. Six prisoners, including myself as Chairman, were appointed a Commission to proceed to Washington, and lay the whole question before the Executive. This was toward the close of August. After some negotiations with General Winder, the balance of twenty-one men due to our government, the six delegates being included, were permitted to come North; and on our way through Macon we met General Stoneman at Prison Oglethorpe, where the Federal officers were confined, and he gave us a letter to the President, strongly urging the necessity of exchange, not for the officers he said, but for the brave men who had fought so gallantly in the field, and suffered so much in prison, and begging the President to forego all idea of the exchange of negroes, if that were the point which stood in the way.

Down to Charleston. Arriving at Pocotaligo, we were exchanged—that is, nine out of the twenty-one, two of the commissioners being kept back, although the twelve not exchanged might as well have been, as there were plenty Confederate prisoners at Beaufort, only a dozen miles away.

Arriving in New York, the four commissioners applied for the necessary transportation at General Dix's office. It was refused, although Colonel Hall, Deputy Provost Marshal at Hilton Head, had given us letters to the headquarters of the department of the east, stating our mission, etc. The Sanitary Commission, however, supplied the transportation, and three of the commissioners proceeded to Washington, I remaining, however, in this city through illness, although I was not idle. They wrote to the President, and reported the object of their visit on three consecutive days; but it distresses me to state *that the representatives of thirty-eight thousand Union prisoners were treated with silent contempt, the President declining to see them or have any communication with them!!!*

For obvious reasons I shall be silent as to the motive of President Lincoln in his treatment of the delegation. But I cannot help stating that the lives of some ten or twelve thousand men might have been spared had an exchange justly, I will not add generously, taken place at this period.

From February to the end of August there were some six thousand

deaths at Andersonville from various causes, circumstances and diseases. This number, I understand, before exchange took place, or our government consented to do so, reached some fifteen or sixteen thousand.

General Winder remarked to us before we quitted Andersonville, that the object of our government in refusing to exchange was that they felt it hard to give soldiers for civilians. "The time," added he, "of thousands of those unhappy men in that stockade is out many months; thousand of others are rendered worthless for soldiers through long confinement, disease and privations—for I will admit that we have not the resources to treat your men as we would wish."

Since I returned to the North, Winder's words were confirmed, for it was semi-officially stated to me that, "It might look very hard that we refused to exchange; but we could not afford to do so. We would have to give a number of strong, well fed, available soldiers for a number of men broken down from campaigning, disease, and out of the service by the expiration of their term."

A policy like this is the quintessence of inhumanity, a disgrace to the Administration which carried it out, and a blot upon the country. You rulers who make the charge that the rebels intentionally killed off our men, when I can honestly swear they were doing every thing in their power to sustain us, do not lay this flattering unction to your souls. You abandoned your brave men in the hour of their cruellest need. They fought for the Union, and you reached no hand out to save the old faithful, loyal, and devoted servants of the country. You may try to shift the blame from your own shoulders, but posterity will saddle the responsibility where it justly belongs.

Sketch of Longstreet's Division—Yorktown and Williamsburg.

By General E. P. ALEXANDER.

At the time of McClellan's arrival at Fortress Monroe the Confederate force at Yorktown under General Magruder scarcely numbered eleven thousand men. Of this force about six thousand formed the garrisons of the intrenched camps at Gloucester Point, Yorktown and Mulberry Island, and the remainder were distributed on the line of the Warwick, a creek which headed within a mile of Yorktown, and flowing across the peninsula, here over twelve miles wide, emptied into the James at Mulberry Island, where batteries had been erected to command the river. The York was defended by a number of batteries at Gloucester Point and Yorktown, but as the majority of the guns in

position were old naval thirty-two pounders, the strength of the position against a serious naval attack was more apparent than real. The land front at Yorktown had been partially fortified, but was by no means secure from assault, and standing timber and neighboring ravines offered sheltered approaches to within very short distance of the works. Below Lee's mill, six miles from Yorktown, no roads crossed the Warwick, and the tide ebbed and flowed in its channel. Above this point three dams, each defended by a slight earthwork, inundated the swamp nearly to its source, but the inundations were frequently fordable, though averaging nearly one hundred yards in width.

As soon as it became known that a large Federal force was being collected at Fortress Monroe, General Johnston was sent to examine the position at Yorktown, to decide whether it could be maintained. His report was unfavorable, being based on the dangers of the isolated position of Gloucester Point, and of a well conducted naval attack up the York, but it was nevertheless determined to hold the line as long as possible, as the possession of the Peninsula was considered necessary to the safety of Norfolk.*

On the 4th of April, General McClellan having arrived at Fortress Monroe and taken command in person, put in motion towards Yorktown the force already assembled, consisting of fifty-eight thousand men and one hundred guns, and at 10 A. M. of the 5th this formidable body appeared in front of the Confederate lines.

With the small force at his disposal for manœuvre, General Magruder marched and counter-marched from point to point, and made such a parade, and put on so bold a front that General McClellan, who seems invariably to have seen Confederates double, imagined himself in the presence of a large force, and after some skirmishing and artillery firing he halted and encamped.

The remainder of the Federal army was hurried up as fast as it arrived at Fortress Monroe, and by the 12th of April the force present for duty exceeded one hundred thousand men.

Meanwhile the army of Northern Virginia (as General Johnston's force was now designated, the department of Northern Virginia having

* The estimate formed by the enemy of the strength of the Peninsula line was very much at variance with the true state of the case. Gen. McClellan says in his report that to have attacked Yorktown by land would have been "simple folly," and that as flag officer Goldsborough, of the Navy, reported it impossible to gather sufficient naval force to attempt it by water, and also impossible to advance up the James, on account of the Merrimac, the only alternative left him was to take Yorktown by siege.

been established during the winter,) remained upon the Rapidan until the 6th of April, awaiting the full development of the enemy's plans. On the 6th, the division of General D. H. Hill was dispatched to Yorktown, moving by rail to Richmond and by steamer to Grove wharf, on the James. It was followed in a few days by the divisions of Longstreet and G. W. Smith, a part marching down the Peninsula, as the transportation was insufficient. D. H. Hill's advance reached Grove wharf on the 9th, and by the 20th the greater part of the three divisions had all arrived. The division of General Ewell was left near Gordonsville in observation of the line of the Rapidan, where it remained until the 30th of April, when it joined General Jackson in the Valley.

On the arrival of General Johnston on the Peninsula, the Confederate forces now numbering fifty-three thousand, were positioned as follows: Gloucester Point, Yorktown, and the adjacent redoubts were held by D. H. Hill's division. Longstreet in the centre held the line of the Warwick, embracing the works at Wynn's mill, and dams No. 3 and No. 2. The brigades of Brigadier-Generals Featherston, Colston and Pryor, were now added to his command, which was styled the "Central Forces."

General Magruder's division held the Warwick below Longstreet's right, and embracing dam number one and Lee's mill.

The division of General Smith was held in reserve, portions of it occasionally relieving brigades in the trenches at exposed points.

The actual hostilities between the two armies were limited to sharpshooting and artillery duelling until the 16th of April, when an attempt was made by General W. F. Smith to get a foot-hold upon the Confederate side of the Warwick, at dam number one. The position was defended by a single available gun (a six-pounder of Stanley's Georgia battery,) a few rifle pits on the bank, and an unfinished breastwork a hundred yards in rear. The inundation in front was over a hundred yards in width, about four feet deep, and overgrown with heavy timber and brushwood. A sharp cannonade was maintained upon it for two hours during the morning, and at 3 o'clock in the afternoon it was renewed by eighteen guns, to which the single six-pounder made a steady reply from its pit. At half-past 3 o'clock a heavy body of infantry was drawn up on the opposite bank, and a musketry fire was also opened, under cover of which four companies of the Third Vermont, afterwards reinforced by eight others, forded the stream and advanced gallantly upon the unfinished breastworks, on which the Fifteenth North Carolina was just then at work. A sharp fight ensued for a few minutes, in

which Colonel McKinney, commanding the Fifteenth North Carolina, was killed, and his regiment, after his fall, was driven back in confusion, and the breastworks were possessed by the enemy. Just at this time, however, Colonel G. T. Anderson, with a part of his brigade, consisting of the Seventh Georgia, Colonel Wilson; the Eighth Georgia, Colonel Lamar, and a part of the Sixteenth Georgia, Colonel Bryan; and two companies of the Second Louisiana, under Colonel Norwood, advanced to the support of the North Carolinians, who rallied upon them, and a charge being made by the whole force, the enemy were driven back across the stream, leaving thirty men dead upon the field, and having many more shot down in the water as they retreated. The total loss of the Confederates during the day were seventy-five killed and wounded.

After the repulse of this assault, a heavy musketry fire was maintained by both parties until night, but, as it was mostly at random through the forest, which intervened except just at the dam, little or no harm was done by it on either side.

Had the assault been made with a larger force, a lodgment could probably have been made, but the sending of a single regiment on such an errand was absurd. The offensive, however, was never McClellan's forte, and his record embraces several other instances of a degree of caution, particularly in the use of his infantry, which rendered any decided success impossible.

After the repulse of this feeble effort, his whole energies were devoted to taking Yorktown by siege, and the construction of parallels and batteries for heavy guns was at once commenced. Meanwhile the Confederates devoted themselves to strengthening their position in every way, daily expecting to be attacked. Owing to the proximity of standing timber on the enemy's side of the stream, his sharpshooters were very close, and their fire was very annoying. This, with other circumstances of the situation, combined to render the hardships undergone by the Confederate troops in this siege peculiarly severe. General Magruder speaks of them in his official report as follows:

"From the 4th of April till the 3rd of May, this army served almost without relief in the trenches. Many companies of artillery were never relieved during this long period. It rained almost incessantly. The trenches were filled with water. No fires could be allowed. The artillery and infantry of the enemy played upon our men almost continuously, day and night. The army had neither coffee, sugar, nor hard bread, but subsisted on flour and salt meats, and these in reduced quantities, and yet no murmurs were heard. The best drilled regulars the world has ever seen would have mutinied under a continuous ser-

vice of twenty-nine days in the trenches, exposed every moment to musketry and shells, in water to their knees, without fire, sugar or coffee, without stimulants, and with an inadequate supply of cooked flour and salt meats. I speak this in honor of those brave men whose patriotism made them indifferent to suffering, to disease, to danger and to death."

These statements are not exaggerated in a single word. The trenches, which were principally in the flat and swampy land bordering the Warwick, filled with water as fast as opened, and could not be drained. Yet the continual firing compelled the men to remain in them, and at points where they were visible to the enemy a hand or a head could not be exposed for a moment without receiving a ball from the telescopic target rifles with which many of their sharp-shooters were armed, and which could be relied on to hit a button at two hundred and fifty yards. The trenches were, moreover, so hastily constructed, that they barely afforded room for the line of battle to crouch in, and in many places egress to the rear being impossible from the severity and accuracy of the sharp-shooters' fire, and locomotion to the right and left being extremely difficult, though the crowds huddled together in the water they soon became offensive beyond description. Fires were strictly prohibited by day and night, the greatest, and what it made it harder to bear, perhaps an entirely unnecessary hardship, under the circumstances. The scanty rations, generally miserably cooked at the camps, were brought into the trenches at night and distributed. False alarms at night were of common occurrence, and would often result in tremendous volleys of musketry, continued on each side for several minutes, and followed by random shelling.

The sick list increased by many thousands, and cases occurred where men actually died in the mud and water of the trenches before they could be taken out to the hospitals.

And not only was there no murmur or complaint, but in the midst of all this the terms of enlistment of a large part of the army expired, and they at once reenlisted for "three years or the war." It might appear that this reenlistment was not voluntary, being performed under the Conscription Act of April 16th, 1862; but this very act was a favorite scheme in the army, and the army influence had no little weight in securing the passage of the bill.

A few Kentucky troops, in the division of General G. W. Smith, alone opposed their own conscription on the ground that Kentucky was not one of the Confederate States, and they were, therefore, not citizens; but their opposition was principally based on a desire to transfer them-

selves to the army in Tennessee, where many troops from Kentucky were serving. Their claim of exemption was not allowed, but they were transferred to the West, as they desired.

By the law of Congress, those regiments who anticipated conscription by re-enlisting, were entitled to reorganize and elect their own officers, and this reorganization and the elections were very generally made during the siege of Yorktown.

Very great changes of officers, particularly of Captains and Lieutenants, resulted from these elections, and while many excellent officers were promoted, many others were entirely thrown out, and the whole effect was very prejudicial to the discipline of the army. A few regiments were entirely dissolved, the men either joining other old organizations or combining to form new ones.

For some time after the commencement of the siege the designs of the enemy were not apparent, as his principal batteries against Yorktown were kept silent and concealed, and only a distant gunboat threw an occasional heavy shell at the surrounding camps. The sharpshooters and the field artillery, however, on both sides, were more implacable than ever afterwards, except in the neighborhood of the mine at Petersburg in 1864, and a single man was scarcely able to show himself at any distance, without having some missile sent after him. Meanwhile the Confederate line was much strengthened and improved, as well as shortened, by being bent back from the Warwick at Lee's mill, and resting its right flank on Skiff creek, a large and deep tributary of the James, an elbow of which here approached within a mile of the Warwick. The intrenched camp at Mulberry Island was left as an independent outwork, being difficult to attack by land. The enemy used his balloons constantly to overlook the Confederate positions, and seemed to command a view of everything that was done, but, strange to say, the information from this source seems to be the most unreliable of all that misled the Federal commander as to his adversary's numbers and movements. General Johnston was much more accurately informed, although the character of the lines was very unfavorable for secret service.*

The dangers of the flank on York river, and perhaps some apprehensions of the effect upon his earthworks of the enemy's one hundred

* A very daring and successful scouting expedition was made by Lieutenant Causey, C. S. A., who was put ashore by a boat at Sewell's Point, on a rainy night, and remained a week within the enemy's lines. He then got possession of a skiff and returned on another favorable night, bringing very accurate returns of the enemy's force and full information of his siege operations.

and two hundred pounder rifles and thirteen inch mortars, decided General Johnston not to undergo the risks of a siege in which the weight of metal would be so vastly against him.*

Accordingly, on the night of Saturday, the 3rd of May, two days before the day appointed by McClellen for opening his batteries, the Army of Northern Virginia was quietly withdrawn from its intrenchments and put in motion up the Peninsula, whither for several days its *impedimenta* had been preceding it. All valuable stores were successfully removed, except the armament and ammunition of the Yorktown batteries, which was necessarily reserved to the last moment for emergencies. A few hours before the evacuation commenced, however, General D. H. Hill opened a bombardment of the enemy's lines which somewhat reduced the ammunition on hand, and also served to prevent any suspicion of his departure. About eighty guns were abandoned in all, including those at Gloucester Point, but their real value was very little, being mostly old ship guns brought from the navy yard at Norfolk, and ranging from thirty-two pounders to eight-inch columbiads—too heavy for land defence and too light for effective water batteries. About seventy-five rounds of ammunition were left for each piece.

About midnight, the infantry having all taken the road, and the rear guard of cavalry being in position, the firing ceased, the guns were spiked and the artillerists were also withdrawn.

The enemy did not discover the retreat until sunrise on the 4th, when they advanced with some caution to investigate the unusual quiet of the Confederate lines. A number of torpedoes had been planted in various places about the deserted lines by General Raines, and one of them was exploded about 3 o'clock in the morning by some cavalry stragglers from the Confederate rear-guard, who entered the town, some of them being wounded by the explosion. Within a short while after the entrance of the enemy several other explosions occurred, causing in all nearly thirty casualties. Other torpedoes were planted by General Raines at points along the route of the retreat, after the

*It has been claimed that the sieges of Vicksburg, Port Hudson and Petersburg have demonstrated that the lines of Yorktown could have been held, in spite of the powerful array of artillery which was prepared against them, and that, therefore, Johnston's retreat was unnecessary. There is no doubt that they could have been held against all front attacks for a long time, but the enemy had other armies in the field, operating against Richmond, and it would certainly have been bad policy to have left the main body of the Confederate army in such a *cul de sac*, and where the enemy's navy could be brought to bear against its flanks with such threatening results.

rear-guard had passed, and current reports afterwards affirmed that one or two exploded among the enemy's cavalry and, and were the cause of great circumspection in their pursuit. Much indignation was expressed by the enemy at this novel mode of warfare, and General McClellan had Confederate prisoners detailed to open the magazines at Yorktown, which it was suspected were arranged with infernal machines.*

The terrible condition of the roads rendered the night-march very slow and laborious, and it was 3 o'clock P. M., on the 4th, when the rear of the infantry reached Williamsburg, twelve miles distant.

Meanwhile McClellan had organized a vigorous pursuit, and one which, had it not failed at the fighting point, would have put the Confederate army in a very critical condition.

The divisions of Franklin, Sedgwick, Porter and Richardson, were sent in steamers up the York to the vicinity of West Point, to cut off Johnston's retreat. The divisions of Hooker, Smith, Kearney, Couch and Casey, preceded by a strong force of cavalry and horse-artillery, marched on Williamsburg in pursuit.

The movements of the Federal cavalry were so well conducted, and rapid, that the principal body of the Confederate cavalry under General Stuart was cut off, and with difficulty made its escape by a circuitous by-way, while the remainder was driven in upon the Confederate infantry column just as its rear was filing into the streets of Williamsburg. Fort Magruder, and the adjoining Confederate entrenchments were for awhile entirely within the enemy's power; but some delay was made to reconnoitre the position and to open a battery, and this delay enabled Kershaw's and Semmes's brigades, of McLaws's division and Macon's battery, to regain the works by a long double-quick through the mud. A little long-range firing then ensued in reply to the Yankee artillery and carbines, until the arrival of General Stuart with the rest of the Confederate cavalry. On this General Hampton with his brigade

* The use of the torpedo was an old hobby with General Raines. During the Seminole war he used them against the Indians with variable success. On one occasion, near Fort King, Florida, he left a shell in the woods, covered by a blanket which blew up the unsuspecting Fed men who found the blanket. A few days afterwards another blanket and shell was dropped in the woods, and soon afterwards the shell was heard to explode. Sallying out with a party of sixteen men to see the success of the trap, Captain Raines found that the blanket had been pulled by a long string, and no harm done. When about to return to the fort his party was attacked by nearly a hundred Indians and with difficulty made good its retreat, losing seven killed and wounded, Captain Raines among the latter.

made a charge upon the enemy's position, using the sabre, and capturing one of his guns and some caissons, and drove him back upon Smith's division of infantry, which had begun to arrive in his rear.

Smith's division was, immediately on its arrival, deployed for an attack, but on moving forward through the dense wood behind which it formed, it was thrown into confusion, and night coming on, only a little skirmishing ensued.

About sundown General Longstreet was ordered to relieve the troops in position with one of his brigades. As his brigades were all small, two were sent, those of Anderson and Prior, by which the lines were occupied during the night with Macon's battery and two sections under Captains Garnett and McCarthy.

On the morning of the 5th the bulk of the Confederate army, with its trains, was pushed forward as fast as possible through a severe rain storm, which converted the roads into quick sands and quagmires, probably the worst that the war produced. Longstreet's division, between 10,000 and 11,000 strong, was left as a rear guard. During the night the division of General Hooker, 9,000 strong, had arrived on the field, opposite the Confederate right, and as soon after daylight as his dispositions could be made, General Hooker commenced a vigorous attack.

The Confederate line was drawn up between Fort Magruder, a considerable enclosed bastioned earthwork of perhaps six hundred yards development of parapet and some small redans, which were part of a chain of such works, twelve in number, besides Fort Magruder and stretching entirely across the Peninsula, on a line about six miles long. The country in front of the Confederate position was open for about seven hundred yards, and the edge of the forest was also levelled, so as to give a range of twelve hundred yards to the guns in Fort Magruder. Anderson's brigade occupied this fort and the vicinity; Pryor's brigade being on its right. The remainder of Longstreet's division was in bivouac beyond Williamsburg; General Longstreet simply standing on the defensive to cover the march of the army.

At half-past 7 o'clock General Hooker began operations by sending forward a battery (Webbers) to take position within seven hundred yards of Fort Magruder, and open upon it, while Grover's brigade, deployed as skirmishers, was directed to push through the felled timber to his front, and right, and, taking position near the battery, to silence the guns in Fort Magruder, and to open communication with Smith's division and the Yorktown road, on which Couch's, Kearney's and Casey's divisions were advancing. The advance of Webber's battery was met by so sharp a fire from Macon's four gun battery in Fort

Magruder, and McCarthy's section, from a redoubt on the right, that, when at length the guns were unlimbered in the assigned positions, the cannoneers had been driven off, and their pieces stood deserted. A second battery, (Bramhall's) was immediately ordered forward, with the officers and men of a third to take charge of Webber's guns, and with the assistance of a heavy fire from the sharpshooters the two batteries were at length gotten to work. An attempt was made to re-establish the Confederate picket line, driven in by this advance, but it proved unsuccessful, and the action became for a while, an interchange of musketry and artillery at several hundred yards range, in which the enemy had a decided advantage with his rifled muskets and cannon over the Confederate smooth-bore muskets and six pounders. The co-operation which General Hooker expected from Smith's division, and the other troops coming up upon the Yorktown road, (his own position being on the Lee's mill road, which united with it behind the line which his skirmishers now held), was not rendered, and his efforts were therefore confined to holding his position, and keeping Longstreet from moving. Meanwhile, Longstreet, appreciating the situation, moved forward Wilcox's and A. P. Hill's brigades, with which he extended his right flank, to envelop Hooker's left and relieve his front. These brigades fell upon Hooker's left flank, composed of Patterson's and a part of Taylor's brigades, and after a sharp fight drove them, with heavy loss, out of a wood and across a considerable piece of ground, on which the trees had been felled but not lopped of their branches. Continuing to advance into this entanglement, the Confederate's were checked by a heavy fire from artillery and the remainder of Patterson's brigade with a portion of Grover's which Hooker withdrew from in front of Fort Magruder. Unable to see their enemy, the line was halted and the fire returned through the branches of the trees, and again for some hours the battle became a fusillade, but at sufficiently close quarters to cause many casualties, although the combatants were invisible to each other.

At this stage of the affair, the battle having assumed considerable proportions, and the slow progress of the retreating trains through the rain and mud making it evident that the ground must be held all day, while fresh supplies of ammunition could not be easily brought back, General Longstreet called for the division of General D. H. Hill, which was still within five miles of Williamsburg, and which was at once turned back. General Johnston also returned to the field with it, but did not assume the command. Pending the arrival of these troops, the remaining brigades of Longstreet's division, Pickett's and Colston's, were brought upon the field, and the latter being held in reserve, General

R. H. Anderson (who in person had supervised all the movements of the morning), was ordered to renew the charge upon the enemy's position. Accordingly, about 1 P. M. the attack upon the enemy's left was recommenced by General Anderson, with Wilcox's and Pickett's brigades, and the First Virginia regiment of A. P. Hill's brigade. (The remainder of A. P. Hill's brigade had entirely expended its ammunition and was held in reserve, close behind the line), supported by Dearing's battery and a section of McCarthy's. The fighting which ensued was severe and prolonged, but resulted in a considerable advance of the Confederate line, the capture of a Federal battery (which, however, could not be brought off on account of the mud and for lack of horses), and the silencing of every gun but one upon that part of the field.*

While matters were progressing thus upon the right, R. H. Anderson's brigade under Colonel Jenkins, with a portion of Pryor's, supported by Stribling's battery and Pelham's horse-artillery, and the fire of Fort Magruder, made an attack upon the enemy's position in front of the fort, and drove him down the road in great confusion, capturing and securing five three-inch rifled guns of Webber's battery.

General Stuart, thinking the enemy routed, moved the cavalry forward in pursuit, but was quickly checked by meeting Peck's brigade of Couch's division, which arrived, and was thrown forward at this time, and afterwards supported by Devon's brigade of the same division. These brigades drove back the pursuit, and in the course of the afternoon made some attempts to capture Pelham's and Stribling's batteries, at one time charging to within a hundred and fifty yards of them. They were, however, driven back into the woods, and the fighting on this portion of the line became a duel, which gradually died out as night came on.

About 3 o'clock the division of General D. H. Hill arrived upon the field, and the second Florida regiment (under Colonel G. V. Ward, who was killed as he led his regiment in,) and a Mississippi battalion from this division were sent with Colston's brigade to relieve the right wing under Anderson, which had now exhausted its ammunition. It happened at this same time that Hooker's division was relieved by the arrival of Kearney, who at once threw forward his three brigades (Jameson's, Birney's and Berry's,) and a fierce fight ensued between these fresh troops. Kearney made several attempts to dislodge his opponent, and by dint of superior numbers had at length regained a

* In this fighting, which lasted several hours, there was an unusual amount of volley-firing by the Federal infantry. The Confederates, as usual, fired only by file.

portion of Hooker's lost ground, when night put an end to the conflict.

On the left of Fort Magruder there were no operations until late in the afternoon, when an affair took place, which might have proved very serious had the Federal Commander, General Sumner, been aggressive or appreciated that he possessed great superiority in numbers. About noon General Sumner had ordered General Hancock, with five regiments and a battery * from his own, and Davidson's brigades of Smith's division, to make a wide detour towards the York river, and take a position upon the Confederate flank. Crossing Cub Dam Creek, General Hancock came upon the line of redans before mentioned, as extending across the Peninsula, and finding the two nearest the York unoccupied, he took possession of them and of a strong natural position on a commanding ridge between them, and having sent for reinforcements opened with his battery upon the two redans between him and Fort Magruder, occupied by a part of R. H. Anderson's brigade. About this time, however, General D. H. Hill's division having arrived, General Longstreet dispatched a portion of it toward his left, and General Early, discovering Hancock's position, got permission to take his brigade, and attempt to drive him off.

General D. H. Hill, being directed to accompany the movement, took charge of the right wing of Early's brigade, composed of the Fifth and the Twenty-Third North Carolina regiments, while General Early in person led the left wing, the Twenty-Fourth and Thirty-Eighth Virginia. Not understanding the topography and guided only by the sound of the enemy's guns, the brigade moved into a wood traversed by a swamp, and so overgrown with brushwood, that in passing through it the regiments were entirely separated from each other. General Early, with the Twenty-Fourth Virginia (Colonel Terry) was the first to emerge from this wood, which he did upon a large open field, across which, half a mile away, was Hancock's position. On the right was one of the redans occupied by Anderson's brigade. On the left another wood, occupied by Hancock's skirmishers, extended towards the Federal position. The skirmishers and battery immediately opened fire upon the Twenty-Fourth Virginia, which returned the fire, and led by General Early in person, charged with a yell across the open field at the battery. The Thirty-Eighth Virginia, on emerging into the field at another point, charged upon the wood held by the enemy's skirmishers, where it became sharply engaged, suffering also considerably from his

* The Sixth and Seventh Maine, Fifth Wisconsin, Thirty-third New York, and Forty-ninth Pennsylvania regiments, and Coner's New York battery of six guns.

artillery fire. The Fifth North Carolina (Colonel McRae) on clearing the wood with General Hill, was, at its Colonel's request, sent in support of the Twenty-Fourth Virginia, while the Twenty-Third North Carolina was brought into the wood, in front, to the support of the Thirty-Eighth Virginia.

The Sixth South Carolina, of Anderson's brigade, from the redan, on the right, came forward at this time to join in the attack, and being joined by the Thirty-Eighth Virginia, from the woods on the left, these two regiments were led by General Hill to the support of the Fifth North Carolina and twenty-Fourth Virginia. These regiments, however, had advanced so far that no support could be rendered, and their gallant charge met with bloody repulse. Moving slowly through the mire and rain, in the face of a murderous fire, which killed or disabled General Early and half of their field officers, the shattered lines traversed the half mile, and mounted the ridge behind which General Hancock had formed a reserve line of sixteen hundred men. When the decimated ranks of the Confederates were within thirty paces, this line suddenly arose and fired and charged. A few of the Confederates were killed with the bayonet, some were captured and the remainder driven back. Seeing the result of the charge, General Hill moved his two supporting regiments into the wood, under cover, and after collecting the wounded as far as practicable, withdrew his brigade.

Night now put an end to the conflict on all parts of the field. The total loss in Longstreet's division was one thousand six hundred and eleven. In D. H. Hill's division it amounted to about five hundred. The Federal loss was two thousand two hundred and twenty-eight.*

Immediately after dark Longstreet began the withdrawal of his division, leaving D. H. Hill as rear-guard. The rain still fell, the night was cold, and the condition of the roads was such, that it really seemed impossible for man or horse to move over them. The sufferings of that night will probably never be forgotten, either by the worn out brigades, who, after the long day's fight, waded and stumbled all night in the mud, or by those who, without fires, crouched along the lines until near daylight, and then set forth again on their march, or by the

* The losses of each brigade of Longstreet's division are not on record. Of the Federal losses four hundred and fifty-six were killed, one thousand four hundred wounded, and three hundred and seventy-two missing. Of these Hooker's division bore the greater share, his report giving three hundred and thirty-eight killed, nine hundred and two wounded, three hundred and thirty-five missing. Hancock's loss in his affair with Early is stated by McClellan at only thirty-one, but perhaps more correctly by Swinton at one hundred and twenty-nine.

wounded, who lay upon the field until found by the enemy the next day, as unfortunately many did.

No pursuit was attempted by the enemy, beyond sending a small force of cavalry, who followed the line of retreat for a few miles, picking up broken down stragglers. It was with difficulty that the rear-guard could drive before it hundreds of such men, so perfectly worn out as to be reckless of all consequences.

Many wagons and ambulances were abandoned in the road, and with them two mountain howitzers and three iron twelve-pounders, which had been sent to Williamsburg from Richmond just before the retreat, and were unprovided with horses.

As General Johnston expected to be attacked by the divisions which McClellan had thrown ahead of him at Eltham's Landing near West Point, the march was hurried as much as possible, and on the 7th the whole army was concentrated at Barhamsville. Franklin's division and one brigade of Sedgwick's having landed during the morning, General Franklin sent out Newton's brigade as a feeler for the Confederate position. Newton had advanced a little over a mile, when, on entering a body of woods, his skirmishers came upon Hood's brigade of Whiting's division, which formed the Confederate advanced guard. Hood immediately attacked Newton with great vigor, and drove him back under cover of the fire of the gunboats, and of a number of batteries which were brought into action near the landing.*

Newton's loss was 49 killed, 104 wounded and 41 missing. Hood's loss is only reported as "slight." Franklin remained quiet the rest of the day, during which the Confederates passed by his front with all their trains and troops, leaving only Whiting's and Hood's brigades as a rear guard, which followed during the night.

*A Federal General remarked at the time: "But for the artillery this would have been another Ball's Bluff." *Rebellion Record*, vol. 5, page 32.

Memoir of the First Maryland Regiment.

By General BRADLEY T. JOHNSON.

PAPER No. 3.

THE AFFAIR AT SANGSTER'S STATION.

As spring approached, the pressure upon McClellan to do something became irresistible. It was evident he must move. He had for six months been organizing an army which for numbers, material and men was represented to be unparalleled. He had drilled it, and disciplined it, inured his men to the duties of the camp, the bivouac and the outpost. By grand reconnaissances and marches he had accustomed them to move in masses.

Notwithstanding, during the winter he had feared, not only to attack Johnston, immensely his inferior in numbers, but to expose himself to Johnston's attack. But his time was come, and the North would wait no longer.

By the 20th of February all our heavy baggage and sick had been sent off, and for a week the army had been in light marching order. On Friday, the 7th of March, the wagons were started, and three days' cooked rations retained. Everything was ready for a move when Colonel Johnson was ordered to proceed to Sangster's Station with 200 men, and there relieve Lieutenant-Colonel Walker, Thirteenth Virginia.

In the companies detailed there were only 150 men, and leaving the rest to bring down rations, Colonel Johnson started, reaching Colonel Walker's reserve two miles and a-half distant, about midday. While he was superintending the relief at one part of the line and Colonel Walker at the other, a vidette came dashing in, saying the "Yankees were coming," and kept on with accelerated speed. Colonel Walker immediately offered to post himself on the railroad on right and rear, to prevent a flank movement, while Colonel Johnson collected his pickets to give them a brush in front. Just then the enemy's skirmishers appeared, and whilst Colonel Johnson was galloping towards parts of A and B companies to hurry them on, having ordered Lieutenant Hough, Company F, to fall back and hold a road, a troop of about forty cavalry charged Company F, some of them chasing the Colonel a short distance, and broke it as it endeavored to reach a fence to form on. Part of it got to the fence, and with Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart, delivered a well directed volley, killed the commanding officer, and saved themselves, except Lieutenant Stewart, who was taken prisoner. In the meantime

Colonel Johnson was hurrying the junction of the other companies to make head against a regiment of infantry that was pressing down in front. Getting within reach of the cavalry engaged with the scattered remains of Company F, he ordered a volley from Company H, which drove them off, taking thirteen prisoners with them.

The battalion then fell back to the railroad, where with the Thirteenth Virginia it took position in advance of the right picket post and awaited the enemy. In the afternoon the Thirteenth was ordered back, and about sundown Colonel Johnson received orders to retire to Union Mills, which he did, burning the bridges and tressle-work on his way. Our loss here was three wounded, Lieutenant Stewart and nine men prisoners; total thirteen. The enemy lost a Lieutenant killed; how many wounded not known. Company F made the best fight under the circumstances that could have been made. Surprised in an open field, and without bayonets, it was not yet sufficiently veterans to receive the charge of cavalry with a volley in close ranks, which would have driven it back.

But the battalion made a narrow escape. General Kearney's division was the attacking force, and his advance of two regiments of infantry and two squadrons of cavalry, refrained from attacking three meagre battalions of the First Maryland and Thirteenth Virginia, numbering in the aggregate not three hundred men. Had General Kearney pressed them rapidly back that day he would have found the whole of Ewell's division on the march, just starting from Manassas. He was then not four miles from them. But he lost the afternoon in reconnoitering to see what the battalion on the railroad, consisting of companies H and I and parts of A and B, First Maryland, meant, and the rear of Johnston's army thus gained four or five hours' march on him. It was dusk when the battalion reached Union Mills, just in time to cross over the burning bridge. The rest of the army had marched, and it was ordered to picket and hold Union Mills ford. About 2 A. M. Lieutenant-Colonel Nichols, Seventh Louisiana, relieved us, and we set off in a brisk march down the Orange and Alexandria railroad.

On Tuesday, 11th, it rejoined the regiment and crossed the Rappahannock, where it went into camp.

THE CAMPAIGN OF THE POTOMAC.

The evacuation of Manassas may be said to have terminated the Potomac campaign. The events of that period are too recent, and the

actors in it too prominent for either an intelligent or impartial analysis of its transactions.

History can only be written from the examination of time, whence the grand movements can be seen unobscured by the dust of action which blinds the immediate contestants. But when history shall know the enormous results achieved by Confederate arms, with almost infinitesimal means, the highest meed will be awarded the genius which used such weapons with such wonderful effect.

When General Johnston evacuated Harper's Ferry his command consisted of hardly 7,000 men of all arms. They were deficient in material, in transportation, in clothes, in ammunition, in every thing. The Maryland battalion had one wagon, which more than sufficed for its baggage and cooking utensils.

Thanks to Mrs. Johnson's energy and the liberality of North Carolina and Governor Ellis, it had excellent arms. The clothing and equipments procured by her did not arrive until we were at Winchester. Many of the men were indecent for the want of clothes, wanting coats, shirts, hats, pants, and shoes.

On the march, Swisher, a gallant boy from Boonsboro', fell out of ranks, and said to Captain Johnson, "Captain, it is impossible for me to keep up, my feet are so sore;" "Well," said the Captain, "I will not order you to do so, but no man of my company has yet fallen out." "Then I wont," said he, and taking his place, barefoot for miles, his steps were literally marked by blood over the sharp stones of the Martinsburg pike. At Bunker Hill, on the 17th June, when Patterson was reported advancing, ammunition was served out, which the men carried in their pockets or haversacks. They had no cartridge boxes. The bold front then showed by General Johnston, with his raw levies, forced Patterson back over the Potomac, with a force certainly three or four times as numerous, and infinitely better equipped. A month after, by that masterly flank march, the Federal General was left at Charlestown, while Johnston swept down on McDowell's right flank, crushing it in, and saving the battle of Manassas. Then he only had nine thousand men up, and with the forces of General Beauregard they routed certainly three times their number. Whatever may be the judgment of history as to the inaction after that battle, and the failure to occupy Washington city, there can be no doubt but that the operations, subsequent to that period in which the city could have been taken, were controlled by the highest appreciation of the rules of the art of war.

In July and August, 1861, the Confederates could have occupied

Washington city. Persons for a week after the battle were constantly coming to the camp at Fairfax Courthouse, and giving full and perfect information as to the utterly confused and defenceless state of the enemy. Why that was not taken advantage of time will show. But after a few weeks it was too late. Then nothing could be done except hold the host McClellan was organizing in check. And this General Johnston did on a line extending from Acquia Creek by Leesburg to Winchester, with a scantiness of resources and disparity of force, which, when known, will not be considered the least remarkable of the great achievements of this war. The fortifications at Centreville, which might have readily been turned at any time by the Sudley Ford road, and the heavy *siege* guns thereon mounted (*of wood*) for four months held at bay a great General and a great army.

When at last McClellan had determined to attack him, and sending Banks by a grand movement by Winchester and the Berryville road to flank the position at Centreville, moved Kearney up the Orange and Alexandria railroad to feel our strength on our right. General Johnston, by alert and prompt action, threw his whole army back to the line of the Rappahannock. This was the second lesson he had given the enemy of eluding a proffered combat, and selecting his own time and occasion for battle with a celerity that confounded all his combinations. It was impossible for him to fight at Manassas. Banks, moving by Front Royal, could have cut his communications at Culpeper Courthouse, or, crossing at Berry's Ferry, seize the Manassas Gap railroad at Piedmont. The campaign of McClellan was frustrated by this sudden move to the Rappahannock. Banks fell back to Winchester, where he remained stationary for several weeks, and McClellan moved his army to the Peninsula.

The retreat from Manassas paralyzed all the operations of the enemy in Northern Virginia for weeks, and rendered an entirely new campaign necessary on his part.

THE CAMP ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK.

While General Johnston from the Rapidan observed McClellan's movements until his attack was developed, whether by way of Yorktown or Fredericksburg, he left General Ewell, who had in February been assigned to General Kirby Smith's division, at Rappahannock station, where the Orange railroad crosses that river. With him were General Stuart and his cavalry. Elzey's brigade went into camp about a mile east of the railroad, and Trimble and Taylor were posted up the

river to the west of it. Here from the 11th of March until the latter part of that month they were undisturbed by any turnout or approach of the enemy. Colonel Steuart left about the 15th for Richmond, where on the 18th he was made Brigadier, and after this period the regiment was under the command of Colonel Johnson. In the early part of April couriers from the front gave notice that the enemy were approaching in force. General Ewell at once took position, and Colonel Johnson was ordered by General Elzey to hold the ford just below the railroad bridge. He placed the regiment in a skirt of wood near the river, but hidden from the view of the enemy, and ordered Captain Goldsborough to deploy company A as skirmishers on the bank. The Baltimore Light Artillery was posted on a mound on our right. Soon the enemy appeared in column in the open ground on the opposite side. They rapidly placed two guns in position and opened on the Baltimore battery, which was plainly visible. That immediately replied, and for some time a sharp duel took place. But the skirmishers of the enemy, in the meantime, had crept up to the bridge, where Goldsborough discovered them, and after a determined skirmish drove them away. It was the first time General Elzey had seen the men skirmish, and the cool manner in which Goldsborough's men deployed under a sharp artillery fire, and then in the fight fired, fell down and loaded lying, excited his admiration. He said no troops in the world could have excelled it.

After the enemy had induced us to fire the bridge he withdrew, having made his reconnoissance. It turned out to be Sumner, from Warrenton, with four thousand infantry, two regiments of cavalry and two batteries, feeling our strength.

After General Elzey had developed the enemy's force, he drew back from the river to induce him to cross, but he was too wary to be caught. A few days afterwards the performance was repeated for the purpose of making a movement down the river, which was subsequently found to be Sumner moving over to unite with McDowell at Fredericksburg. On each occasion, however, as soon as they attempted to fall back, Stuart pounced upon them with his cavalry and made them pay in prisoners for their expedition.

On the 18th of April, after one of these skirmishes, at sunset, in the most tremendous rain of the season, the whole command marched to Culpeper, distant ten miles, which it reached before daybreak, well jaded by a night march in the dark and rain, over a railroad. Such marching is peculiarly tiresome. The sills cramp and fatigue the legs,

and break shoes, so that a day's march on a railroad has always done more harm to men than two or three on an ordinary dirt road.

From Culpeper we started for Madison Courthouse, but marching in that direction five or six miles, retraced our steps, and continuing on the railroad, the next night reached Orange Courthouse. During most of the time it was raining, and the wet bivouacs made it anything but comfortable. After going to Gordonsville we camped at Liberty Mills, or Somerset, seven miles west of it. Thence by a delightful road, sixteen miles to Stanardsville, a charming village in the bosom of the Blue Ridge, and from there through Swift Run gap into the Valley of Virginia to the Shenandoah, at Conrad's store. The river was dear to the regiment. Born at the point of its debouchure at Harper's Ferry, it was destined to start from its head in the mountains and to illustrate a glorious campaign on its banks, equalled by few and surpassed by none. We got to know the Shenandoah; we crossed it on the grand march to Manassas; we fought over it at Front Royal; the echoes of Bolivar sent the ring of our rifles across its bosom to Loudoun, and thence they leaped back to Maryland; and at Mount Jackson and Rood's hill we trusted to the river to protect our flank while we fronted Fremont's pursuit; at Cross Keys and Port Republic again its pure waters were mingled with blood. In this quiet nook General Ewell remained until he started on the glorious campaign down the Valley, which at once placed the name of Jackson by the side of the greatest soldiers.

THE CAMPAIGN OF THE VALLEY.

The evening Ewell arrived at Conrad's store Jackson marched from there. He had been followed up the Valley by Banks and Shields, who were then near New Market, and had taken refuge from their pursuit in the lock of the mountains at Conrad's, with the river in his front and the Blue Ridge on his flanks and rear. Marching to Port Republic, he crossed into the Piedmont country by Brown's gap, striking the Virginia Central road at Waynesboro, and thence was not heard of for days. Banks telegraphed that Jackson had *fled from him*. About the 10th of May, however, news came from that General in his laconic dispatch, "GOD HAS GIVEN US A VICTORY AT McDOWELL'S TO-DAY."

Passing swiftly through Staunton, he had fallen like a thunderbolt on Milroy at McDowell, and hurled him back. Then wheeling down the Valley, he was already on the march for Banks. On the 14th Ewell marched for Columbia bridge, but Shields had already passed it and gone through Luray, over the mountain, towards Fredericksburg.

Then it appeared that Banks began to have some faint idea of his imminent peril, for he fell back rapidly to Strasburg, a strong position, well fortified. Ewell, on the 17th, passed the Shenandoah for New Market gap, whence on the 21st he marched to the top of Milem's gap, on the Graves road. Jackson, in the meantime, had swept up the Valley to New Market. While Ewell halted here, it was that Jackson is said to have requested "fewer orders and more men." That at least was the camp story about him. At any rate he there assumed command of Ewell, who retraced his steps to Luray, where he formed a junction with Jackson on the 22d. At this time Brigadier-General Steuart, who had been assigned to the command of the "Maryland Line," reported for duty, and the First Maryland and Baltimore Artillery were assigned to him as composing the Line. The regiment marched over, and thus Colonel Johnson took leave of "*Old Blucher*," their first Colonel, under whom they had so long served and to whom they were greatly attached. Through the trials and sufferings incident to a young soldier's career, he had always furnished them the model of the soldier and the officer, and they parted from him with great reluctance, though glad enough to go into the Line. In camp on the 23d, eight miles north of Luray, a number of men who claimed to have been enlisted for twelve months, refused to do duty because their time was up. While they were firm they were at the same time perfectly respectful, and only desired, they said, to have the matter determined by the proper authority. All of the companies enlisted at Richmond had been mustered in for twelve months, and on the 17th of May, the year having expired, Company C, Captain R. C. Smith, had been mustered out and discharges given them by Colonel Johnson.

On the 21st, some twenty men of Companies A and B, who were also twelve months' men, enlisted by Colonel Johnson at the Point of Rocks, but who had not reenlisted with the rest of their companies, were also discharged by the Colonel.

These men demanded their discharges also from him. He explained to them that their cases were different, that their muster rolls showed they were regularly enlisted at Harpers Ferry by Lieutenant-Colonel Deas, "*for the war*;" that those muster rolls had regularly been filed in the War Department, and that the regular bi-monthly muster ever since had also showed they were "*for the war*," and that even if they had been deceived, as they alleged, and had signed the muster rolls without understanding them, he had no power to discharge them. Their proper mode of proceeding was to apply through him to the Secretary of War. Many were satisfied at this, but many ran away

without waiting for this explanation. Some dozen, however, were not willing to do duty, would not desert, and preferred going to the guard-house.

On the morning of the 24th the regiment started on the march sullen and unhappy. Many men were greatly mortified at what had occurred, so injurious to the reputation of the "First Maryland," which had always been without a blemish, and many were uncertain whether they were right or wrong. Thus they plodded along, silent, lifeless, and without spirits. Mile after mile they trudged, round and round the mountain road, until a courier rode up to Colonel Johnson. He brought an order for the First Maryland to come immediately to the front and attack the enemy. Ewell was there and had sent for us. The Colonel halted the command instantly. He told the men, in few and stirring words, that they had been selected to open the fight. They were placed in the post of honor, but that he would not lead dissatisfied men. He would not risk the honor of Maryland with men who could not sustain it if discontented and spiritless. Every man who felt aggrieved he demanded should lay down his arms and go to the rear with the guard, but he invoked them to beware how they did so. They should recollect that a woman had given them those very arms which they would thus throw down in the presence of the enemy, and their duty to their friends at home would restrain them. They had a heavy debt to pay for the dungeons of the Northern tyranny. After the battle he promised them he would forward any complaints to the Secretary of War. The mountain sides then rang with cheers, and "We won't leave you;" "we will not disgrace the State;" "we don't want to dodge," came from all sides. The dozen prisoners in charge of the guard begged to be allowed to come in; the Colonel consented, released them, and sent them back to the wagon, seven miles off, for their rifles. They ran all the way back, and got up in time for the fight at Front Royal. All were up that night. New life was infused into the mass, and the men sprang forward with that quick elastic step for which they were noted, and which Kirby Smith and Whiting used to say was more like the French than anything they had ever seen. The whole column halted to let us pass. The Louisiana brigade presented arms, and the men seemed to tread on air as they swung along. The glorious old Fourth, and "Blucher," the whole army, cheered enthusiastically. "There they go! look at them," was the universal cry, as, not two hundred and fifty strong, they tramped at quick time through column after and took the front.

General Stenart, who had also been assigned a cavalry brigade, was

ahead, and about 1 o'clock we came in sight of the enemy's pickets. The sentinel on post, in a red shirt, was taking his ease at full length under a rail shelter. The group of horsemen, Generals Ewell, Taylor and Steuart, Colonel Johnson and others, who halted to reconnoitre, appeared somewhat to puzzle him. He looked, and looked again, as if he could not believe his eyes, at last, lazily getting up, he reached over for his musket, and all at once quickly raised it, fired, and ran for his life. The truth had suddenly flashed on his benighted brain that the "Rebels" were upon him. After him went companies D and G, on the right and left as skirmishers, and down the road charged a squad of cavalry. In a few minutes the whole post was captured. "What regiment do you belong to?" said Colonel Johnson to a Dutchman whom a cavalryman was double-quicking to the rear: "I belongs to de First Maryland," said Hans. "There's the First Maryland," shouted the Colonel, as the boys sprang on again in a run. The First Maryland Yankees had long been an object of great interest to us. We had often heard of their expressed anxiety to make our acquaintance, and the feeling had got to be quite warm in reciprocity. If there was anything we did desire, next to marching down Baltimore street, it was to get as close to the bogus First Maryland as possible. We knew that while it had many Baltimore men in it, a large proportion were Dutch Yankees, and such people, and had a private idea that any intimate intercourse between the two regiments would not be healthy for them. And, now here they were, close at hand. It was delightful. While the regiment was halted a second or two to breathe and reform, our skirmishers could be seen engaged with the enemy, posted in a large hospital, from which they were showering balls. "Colonel" said, General Steuart, "Can't you take that building?" It was distant six or seven hundred yards. "I think so," said the Colonel. "There they are, boys;" "take them," said he. Off we went with a yell, every man doing his prettiest with his legs. Adjutant Ward dashed ahead, saying, "By your permission, Colonel," while Major Wheat shot by like a rocket, his red cap gleaming, revolver in hand, and got in first, throwing his shots right and left. The hospital was taken. Charging through the village, some of the men ran against a large squad of Yankees, who fired right in their faces without effect. Clearing the town on the Winchester road, a line of battle could be perceived on the crest of a hill half a mile off, and advancing to a stone fence near to it, Colonel Johnson halted to collect and breathe the men. In a few minutes their skirmishers came rapidly down the hill into the wheat field in front. The whole battalion then advanced as skirmish-

ers, with Wheat's men on our left. The enemy opened on us sharply with shell from two pieces, and though shooting remarkably well, did no execution. During the rest of the afternoon, after a short struggle, their skirmishers were driven back, and Captain Nicholas was ordered to take a white house to the left of the road, which would give him a flank fire on their line, while Colonel Johnson, with Captains Smith and Herbert, turned them on the right. Nicholas got nearly to his position, but was obliged to give ground on account of Wheat's battalion falling back and exposing his flank. Smith pushed his way rapidly on the hill until within reach of the cannonneers at the guns, when a squadron of cavalry came rapidly down the hill, evidently intended for the centre of the skirmishers. Smith was immediately ordered back to form with Captain Robertson and repel their charge, but they retired without making an attack. The right of our line then swung rapidly round, while Goldsborough and Nicholas closed in on them on the left, in a run, in conjunction with Wheat. Their colors was captured in their camp by Private Drers, Company H, together with their camp fixtures, tents, &c., and some prisoners, while Smith, Herbert, Robertson, and Murray were pressing them as they crossed the railroad bridge over the Shenandoah. Private Tom Levering, Company H, brought seven prisoners to the Colonel, and Valiant, Company E, brought a Lieutenant with a fine horse and equipments.

They had been driven so rapidly over the bridges that no time was allowed to burn them; a small fire kindled on the upper one was thrown off before any damage was done, and we immediately crossed to the railroad depot, where there was a large quantity of stores. Here we bivouaced while the rest of the column marched on to camp. As they went by the greatest delight was manifested at our success. "The real First Maryland had whipped the bogus," was the common expression and cheers and shouts came from every passing battalion and brigade. Elzey rode by, and turning to the hearty cheers of the men, took off his hat, saying, "Boys, I knew you'd do it." All night long prisoners were being brought in by the cavalry, who went within three miles of Winchester and captured the whole force, except some twenty or thirty infantry and a few cavalry. The prisoners were under our charge, and the recognitions among old acquaintances were highly amusing, although the conversations which generally passed between them were not of a polite or complimentary character. The total of prisoners of that night and next morning was about 900.

The Yankee force engaged was under Colonel John R. Kenly, First Maryland (bogus) and consisted of his own regiment, with the exception

of one company off on duty, which escaped, but having in the fight near 700 men; two companies, Twenty-Ninth Pennsylvania, 150 men; one squadron, New York cavalry, 125 men; one section artillery, 75 men; making a total of 1,050. About 100 were killed and wounded, and perhaps fifty escaped.

Against this force were engaged the First Maryland, Colonel Johnson, and special Louisiana battalion, Major Wheat; the first 250 strong, the last 175—total, 425. Not a gun was fired by any other infantry during the fight; no one else was engaged, and no one pressed the enemy until after he had been driven across the Shenandoah, when the cavalry pitched on him and captured most of his men. About one hundred were taken on the field. Some half a dozen shots were fired by one of our pieces during the skirmish, and no other aid was offered us. It was evidently General Jackson's intention to make us whip the enemy by ourselves, and consequently we were left struggling in the unequal contest for four or five hours before we succeeded in driving them from their position. But we did succeed! During his retreat Colonel Kenly for a while kept his men well together, and made a gallant resistance to our cavalry charge, but being cut down and captured his command was then easily dispersed and picked up. One captain surrendered himself and seventeen of his men to a boy of sixteen, of the Second Virginia cavalry, who, riding in the woods alone, was suddenly accosted, and finding himself surrounded, was about making a run for it when this little captain relieved himself of his sword and the cavalryman of his anxiety by giving up the whole party.

The next morning, Saturday, General Jackson proposed to Colonel Johnson to send him back in charge of the prisoners to Richmond, but the Colonel declined the offer, preferring to keep in the front. It would have been exceedingly desirable to have the regiment at Richmond for a few days to recruit, but he thought it better to stay where he was, and subsequent occurrences justified his judgment. We were then ordered to Middletown, on the Valley turnpike, with the Baltimore Light Artillery, to support General Steuart, who with some cavalry had got into Banks's rear. We reached within two miles of that point during the afternoon, and found General Steuart retiring, having been driven out by infantry. We then retraced our steps and camped by the side of a stream, seven miles from Winchester, without fires, and in the rain, without blankets.

History of Lane's North Carolina Brigade.

BY GENERAL JAMES H. LANE.

FINAL REPORT.*From Petersburg to Appomattox.*

APPOMATTOX C. H., April 10th, 1865.

Major—I have the honor to report that on the night of the 1st of April, four regiments of my brigade, with intervals between the men varying from six to ten paces, were stretched along the works between Battery Gregg and Hatcher's run, in the following order from right to left: Twenty-eighth, Thirty-seventh, Eighteenth, Thirty-third. The right of the Twenty-eighth resting near the brown house in front of General McRae's winter quarters, and the left of the Thirty-third on the branch near Mrs. Banks's. The enemy commenced shelling my line from several batteries about nine o'clock that night, and the picket lines in my front opened fire at a quarter to two o'clock the following morning. The skirmishers from McGowan's brigade, who covered the works held by my command, were driven in at a quarter to five o'clock, and my line was pierced by the enemy in strong force at the ravine in front of the right of the Thirty-seventh, near General McGowan's headquarters. The Twenty-eighth, enfiladed on the left by this force, and on the right by the force that had previously broken the troops to our right, was forced to fall back to the plank road. The enemy on its left took possession of this road and forced it to fall still further back to the Cox road, where it skirmished with the enemy and supported a battery of artillery by order of Brigadier-General Pendleton. The other regiments fought the enemy between McGowan's winter quarters and those occupied by my brigade, and were driven back. They then made a stand in the winter quarters of the right regiment of my command, but were again broken, a part retreating along the works to the left, and the remainder going to the rear—these last, under Colonel Cowan, made a stand on the hill to the right of Mrs. Banks's, but were forced back to the plank road, along which they skirmished for some time, and then fell back to the Cox road, where they supported a battery of artillery by order of Lieutenant-General Longstreet.

That portion of my command which retreated along the works to the left, made two more unsuccessful attempts to resist the enemy, the last stand being made in the Church road, leading to the Jones house. It

then fell back to Battery Gregg, and the battery to its left, but under Major Wooten and assisted by a part of Thomas's brigade, it soon after charged the enemy, by order of Major-General Wilcox, and cleared the works as far as the branch, on which the left of the Thirty-Third rested the night previous. Here we were rejoined by Colonel Cowan, and we deployed as skirmishers to the left of the Church road and perpendicular to the works, but did not hold this position long, as we were attacked by a strong line of skirmishers supported by two strong lines of battle. A part of us retreated to Battery Gregg and the rest to the new line of works near the "dam." Battery Gregg was subsequently attacked by an immense force, and fell after the most gallant and desperate defence. Our men bayoneted many of the enemy as they mounted the parapet. After the fall of this battery, the rest of my command along the new line, was attacked in front and flank, and driven back to the old line of works running northwest from Battery 45, where it remained until the evacuation of Petersburg. We were here rejoined by the Twenty-Eighth, under Captain Linebarger.

On the afternoon of the 8d we crossed the Appomattox at Goode's bridge, bivouaced at Amelia Courthouse on the 4th, and on the 5th formed line of battle between Amelia Courthouse and Jetersville, where our sharp-shooters, under Major Wooten, became engaged. Next day, while resting in Farmville, we were ordered back to a fortified hill to support our cavalry, which was hard pressed, but before reaching the hill the order was countermanded, we were moved rapidly through Farmville, and sustained some loss from the artillery while crossing the river near that place. That afternoon we formed line of battle, facing to the rear, between one and two miles from Farmville, and my sharp-shooters were attacked by the enemy. During the night we resumed our march, and on the 9th, while forming line of battle, we were ordered back, and directed to stack our arms, as the Army of Northern Virginia had been surrendered.

My officers and men behaved well throughout this trying campaign, and superiority of numbers alone enabled the enemy to drive us from our works near Petersburg. Colonel Cowan, though indisposed, was constantly with his command, and displayed his usual gallantry, while Major Wooten nobly sustained his enviable reputation as an officer.

We have to mourn the loss of Captains Nicholson, Faine, McAulay and Long, and other gallant officers.

Captain E. J. Hale, Jr., Assistant Adjutant-General, and First Lieutenant E. B. Meade, Aide de Camp, were constantly at their posts, dis-

playing great bravery, and giving additional evidence of their efficiency as Staff Officers.

I am unable to give our exact loss at Petersburg. I surrendered at this point fifty-six officers and four hundred and eighty-four men, many of the latter being detailed non-armsbearing men, who were sent back, to be surrendered with their brigade.

The Seventh, the other regiment of my command, is absent in North Carolina on detached service.

I am, Major,

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

JAMES H. LANE, *Brigadier-General.*

Major Jos. A. ENGELHARD, Assistant Adjutant-General.

The Gettysburg Campaign—Operations of the Artillery.

REPORT OF COLONEL J. THOMPSON BROWN.

HEAD-QUARTERS ARTILLERY, SECOND CORPS,

August 13, 1863.

Major A. S. Pendleton, A. A. G.:

MAJOR,—In accordance with your order of same date, I beg leave to submit a report of the operations of this command since the army left the line of the Rappahannock.

About 12 M. June 13th Johnson's division with Andrews's battalion came in sight of Winchester, on the Front Royal road, driving in the enemy's advance and exploding one of their limbers. Nothing further was done by us this day with artillery.

On June 14th Lieutenant-Colonel Jones, with his own battalion and four batteries of First Virginia artillery, under Captain Dance, moved over with Early's division to a position to the right and rear of the enemy, and about 4 o'clock opened a most effective fire, with twenty guns, upon the work west of the flag fort.

This heavy artillery fire enabled the infantry to take this work with but little loss.

This artillery was afterwards advanced to the captured work, prepared to drive the enemy from the flag fort on the next morning.

To assist in this twelve additional guns were on this night in position on an abandoned hill in the Valley turnpike, and near Hollingsworth's

mills. At this point the Baltimore Light Artillery, attached to Jenkin's cavalry, did good service on the 14th.

This disposition would, I think, have insured the fall of their main work, but the enemy retired during the night.

On the morning of the 15th Lieutenant-Colonel Andrews, with Dement's and sections from Raines's and Carpenter's batteries, had a sharp engagement with the enemy's infantry, who were retreating on the road towards Charlestown by Jordan's springs. Great credit is due the officers and men for the spirited and determined manner in which they fought the enemy's infantry at close quarters.

Especial credit is due Lieutenant Contee, of Captain Dement's battery, and the section under his command. Lieutenant Contee is recommended for promotion to Captaincy for gallantry on this occasion, and I ask that he be ordered to command of the Chesapeake artillery, made vacant by the death of Captain Brown. Sergeants Harris and Glascock and Corporals Compton, Thompson and May, of this section, are much to be praised for their coolness and bravery on this occasion.

This glorious victory, in which the artillery played so conspicuous a part, was saddened by the death of Captain Thompson, Louisiana Guard, Jones's battalion, whose gallantry as a soldier and high character as a gentleman were conspicuous in the corps.

Lieutenant-Colonel Andrews and Lieutenant Contee were also wounded. In addition to these casualties there were five killed and fourteen wounded.

There were captured from the enemy at Winchester four 30-pound Parrotts, seventeen 3-inch rifles and two 24-pound howitzers. The first two classes were exchanged for inferior guns, which were left at Winchester.

While these two divisions were engaged in the capture of Winchester, General Rodas with Carter's battalion had moved around by Berryville to Martinsburg, which place was abandoned after a short artillery fight, in which Captain Fry's battery lost one killed and one wounded. Five 3-inch rifles were taken at this point, which were also exchanged.

No further engagements with artillery occurred until the battle of Gettysburg.

On July 1st Rodas's division came upon the enemy near Gettysburg, and Lieutenant-Colonel Carter's battalion engaged them with fine effect, all his batteries being in action and behaving most gallantly, Captains Page's and Carter's suffering most severely.

Lieutenant-Colonel Jones's battalion coming up on the York road,

with Early's division, also engaged the enemy advancing upon Rodes's left and Early's right, and with fine effect.

After Gettysburg was taken Johnson's division, with Andrews's and the two reserve battalions came up under the impression and hope that the wooded hill on the enemy's right would be taken that evening.

I sent an officer to move on with the division and endeavor to find a road for the artillery. The attempt to take the hill was not made, however, that evening.

On the 2d, about four o'clock, a heavy fire was opened upon the enemy's line from Andrew's battalion, under Major Latimer, on our extreme left, aided by Graham's battery (First Virginia artillery), and from Dance's, Watson's and Smith's batteries (First Virginia artillery), on the right of our line, extending beyond the brick Seminary. This fire was well directed and effective. Unfortunately the enemy's position on their extreme right was so excellent, and the number of guns concentrated at that point so great, that after a most gallant fight, Major Latimer was forced to withdraw three of his batteries, leaving one to repel any advance of their infantry. It was while with this battery that this gallant and accomplished officer, and noble young man received the wound which has resulted in his death. No heavier loss could have befallen the artillery of this corps.

On the 3d the First Virginia Artillery, and a portion of Carter's and Nelson's battalions, engaged the enemy's batteries in order to divert their fire from our infantry, advancing from the right. This fire was well directed, and its fine effect was very noticeable. Their fire from the Cemetery hill was at one time almost completely silenced, and had we been able to continue our fire with shell, the result would have been entirely satisfactory, but owing to the proximity of our infantry to the enemy, and the defective character of some of the shell, the batteries were compelled to use solid shot.

On the 4th the left was swung around on the ridge opposite the enemy's, and the guns placed in position, but no firing. On the 2d and 3d Green's battery, Jones's battalion, operated with Hampton's cavalry, and did excellent service. Tanner's battery, of same battalion, having been sent back with the wagon train, was enabled to do good service in driving off the enemy's cavalry at Williamsport. Captain Brown, of Andrews's, and Captain Page, of Carter's battalions, and Lieutenant Brown, of First Virginia Artillery, were also wounded in this engagement.

In addition there were twenty-one killed and 104 wounded. One Napoleon was captured and exchanged by Lieutenant-Colonel Jones for one

of his, disabled. In this engagement, as in the one at Winchester, the officers and men behaved with the greatest gallantry, fully sustaining the high character which they had previously borne.

After crossing into Virginia there was no serious fighting. Colonel Carter fired a few shots at the enemy advancing upon our rear in crossing the Potomac, and also fired upon them as they attempted to cross at Manassas gap.

Owing to the loss by capture of the transportation and forges (with few exceptions) of First Virginia artillery and Carter's and Nelson's battalions, and the loss of ninety-two horses at Gettysburg, the artillery of the corps has had great difficulties to contend with.

They brought off everything from across the river to this point, with the exception of one caisson, for the loss of which the officer responsible is now under charges. The horses are in low order, but are improving.

Very respectfully,

J. THOMPSON BROWN,
Colonel and Acting Chief Artillery Second Corps.

REPORT OF LIEUTENANT-COLONEL WILLIAM NELSON.

HEADQUARTERS ARTILLERY BATTALION,
August 4, 1863.

Colonel J. Thompson Brown,
Acting Chief Artillery, Second Corps:

COLONEL,—In accordance with orders just received, I have the honor to make the following report of the operations of the respective batteries of my command "in the battle of Gettysburg, and all engagements since that time."

I reached Gettysburg with my command Wednesday evening, July 1st, 1863, and received orders to report to Major-General Rodes, who ordered me to report to Lieutenant-Colonel Carter, commanding artillery of his division.

Having done so, I was ordered early on Thursday morning to keep my guns in readiness for action immediately in rear of heights overlooking the town, and about one-fourth of a mile to the left of the Cashtown turnpike. About 11 o'clock, A. M., I was ordered to bring my battalion to a point immediately in rear of the Gettysburg College, park my batteries and await events.

Having with your assistance selected positions which my batteries

could occupy in case the enemy should turn their attention to that portion of the line, I remained at this point until night, when I returned to the position which I occupied in the morning. On Friday, the 3d, I was ordered to report with my command to Major-General Johnson, commanding the extreme left of our line.

Having done so, I was ordered to reconnoitre the positions on our left, and if any could be found, from which I might attract the enemy's fire from our infantry, to occupy them.

Having reconnoitered the positions along this portion of our line, and finding none suitable for the purpose mentioned above, I kept my batteries concealed during the day behind the hills immediately in rear of the battlefield.

About 12 o'clock, M., I was ordered to draw the attention of the enemy's batteries from our infantry in connection with Captain Graham, commanding Rockbridge artillery, and fired about twenty or twenty-five rounds from a point to the left, and somewhat in advance of Captain Graham's position. On Friday night I encamped about one-half of a mile in rear of my position of that day, and about midnight received orders to move my command with General Johnson's division to the point which I occupied on Thursday morning.

On Saturday morning, July 4th, I was ordered to take position on the heights west of the town, and about one-fourth of a mile to the left of the Cashtown road, supported by a brigade of General Johnson's division; here we remained until night, awaiting an attack of the enemy. On Saturday night we fell back from Gettysburg, in the direction of Hagerstown, which we reached on Tuesday, the 7th. Here we remained until Friday, the 9th, when I was ordered to send one Napoleon gun and one rifle piece to report to Brigadier-General Daniel near the Antietam Creek.

The rifle piece was engaged for a short time. I then received orders to move my command, in connection with General Johnson's division, to a point about equi-distant from the National road and the Williamsport and Hagerstown turnpike, and one mile and a-half from the town.

On Saturday, the 10th, I was ordered to post my batteries, two on the left of Williamsport road and one immediately to the left of the Frankstown and Williamsport road, supported by a portion of General Johnson's division. We remained in position until Monday evening, awaiting an attack of the enemy, when we fell back in the direction of Williamsport. Arriving at that place, we were ordered to move to Falling Waters and cross the river on a pontoon bridge, which we did,

reaching the Virginia shore about 9 A. M. Tuesday, 14th, and encamping about six miles from the river.

I remain, Colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

[Signed,]

W. NELSON,
Lieutenant-Colonel Commanding Artillery Battalion.

Official: S. V. SOUTHALL,

Adjutant Artillery, Second Corps.

REPORT OF LIEUTENANT-COLONEL H. P. JONES.

HEAD QUARTERS ARTILLERY BATTALION, August 4, 1863.

Lieutenant Southall,—On the morning of the 1st July, while marching in rear of Early's division, I received an order from General Early to bring the batteries at once to the front for the purpose of engaging the enemy. This I did, and found on arriving at the front that the enemy were posted in front of Gettysburg, and engaging hotly what I afterwards learned was General Rodes's division.

I immediately brought twelve guns into position and opened a brisk fire upon the enemy's artillery and infantry, taking them in flank as they were being massed upon Rodes's left and General Early's right. The batteries were very soon driven from the position and forced to retire, leaving one carriage disabled, which, however, they afterwards succeeded in getting off. Our fire was very effective upon their infantry, presenting as they did large bodies in easy range of us. In this engagement I had three guns temporarily disabled and one permanently so. One man was killed of the "Louisiana Guard Artillery," and one wounded of the "Staunton Artillery."

For your better information I have the honor herewith to enclose the reports of Captains Tanner and Green of the operations of their batteries at Wrightsville, Hunterstown, South Mountain and Williamsport.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

[Signed,]

H. P. JONES,
Lieutenant-Colonel Commanding Artillery Battalion.

Official: S. V. SOUTHALL,

Adjutant Artillery Second Corps.

REPORT OF COLONEL T. H. CARTER.

HEADQUARTERS ARTILLERY BATTALION,

August 5th, 1863.

Colonel.—In accordance with special order No. 24, Headquarters Artillery Second Corps, I herein transmit a report of the operations of my battalion in the battle of Gettysburg. On reaching the field, the 1st of July, the enemy was found to be in possession of a high ridge west of Gettysburg. Their advance line occupied a small crest still further west, and was engaged with A. P. Hill's corps when we arrived.

Rodes's division was deployed in two lines at right angles to the high crest, and to the enemy's lines of battle. The batteries of Captain Carter and Captain Fry were ordered to a high point in front of Rodes's line, near the Cashtown turnpike, to enfilade the enemy's lines and batteries, which stretched along the small crest to the railroad cut. The batteries fired with very decided effect, compelling the infantry to take shelter in the railroad cut, and causing them to change front on their right.

The enemy's guns replied slowly. Owing to the exposed position of Captain Carter's battery, which was unavoidable, it suffered much at this point, having four men killed outright and seven more or less severely wounded.

The enemy finding their position untenable and turned by a strong force, extended their line to their right, to confront us. General Rodes therefore sent for two batteries, and posted them on the left. Captains Page and Reese, then not engaged, were ordered to report to him.

Captain Page opened from a point at the foot of a high ridge on the infantry advancing on Colonel O'Neal. The artillery of the enemy by this time had taken position in the valley north of Gettysburg and, delivered a very destructive oblique fire on Page's battery; his loss here was heavy—two men killed, two mortally wounded, and twenty-six more or less badly wounded; seventeen horses killed and disabled, but it was borne with unflinching courage by the gallant Captain and his officers and men, until ordered to retire to another position.

General Doles, on the left of the front line of General Rodes's division, reported a large force massing on his front and left near the

Hidlersburg road, and asked to be supported by artillery. Leaving Captain Fry at the first position on the high ridge, Carter's, Page's and Reese's batteries were put in position at the foot of the high ridge and in rear of Doles's brigade, to prevent the enemy from turning Rodes's extreme left. Here these batteries rendered excellent service, driving back both infantry and artillery. Captain Carter's battery was particularly effective in its fire at this position.

General Early now advanced. Doles took it up, and Rodes's whole line pressed forward, forcing back the enemy at all points. My battalion followed, a few pieces unlimbering from time to time to break up the formations of the enemy as they endeavored to rally under cover of the small crest near the town. After the capture of Gettysburg no further movement was made during the afternoon.

On Thursday, the second of July, my battalion was held in readiness to move into position, but was not engaged. On Friday, the 3d of July, ten rifle guns were posted on the high ridge on right and left of the railroad cut, and their fires directed on the batteries planted on the Cemetery hill.

This was done to divert the fire of the enemy's guns from Hill's and Pickett's troops in their charge across the valley, and also to divert their fire from three batteries of the First Virginia artillery under Captain Dance and temporarily in my command. These three batteries had been ordered to fire in conjunction with a large number of guns on their right on a salient part of the enemy's line prior to the charge of infantry. The effect of this concentrated fire on that part of the line was obvious to all. Their fire slackened and finally ceased. It was feebly resumed from a few guns when Pickett's and Hill's troops advanced, but the most destructive fire sustained by these troops came from the right and left of this salient. The smooth-bore guns of my battalion were held in readiness to move in rear of Gettysburg College, but were not needed. My whole battalion took position at Falling Waters to cover the crossing on the pontoon bridge; a few rounds were fired at the enemy's line of sharpshooters as they attempted to press our skirmishers approaching the bridge. The pursuit was checked without further difficulty. At Front Royal the battalion turned off to the Manassas gap, and took position about two miles from the top. Two batteries (Page's and Fry's) only were engaged. Our skirmishers held the enemy's lines of battle in check for some time, but were finally driven back by greatly superior numbers. The above mentioned batteries then opened and kept back the enemy until dark,

when our troops were withdrawn. The enemy displayed one battery and 12,000 or 15,000 infantry.

Total loss in killed, wounded and prisoners, sixty-five.

I am, Colonel, very respectfully,
your obedient servant,

[Signed]

THOS. H. CARTER,
Lieutenant-Colonel Com'dg Battalion Art'y.

Official: S. V. SOUTHALL,
Adjutant Artillery Second Corps.

Colonel J. T. Brown, Chief Artillery Second Corps.

REPORT OF COLONEL R. SNOWDEN ANDREWS.

HEADQUARTERS ANDREWS'S ARTILLERY BATTALION,
Camp near Liberty Mills, August 5, 1863.

COLONEL,—I have the honor to submit the following reports of the movements and operations of Lieutenant-Colonel R. Snowden Andrews's battalion of artillery, attached to General Edward Johnson's division infantry in the battle of Gettysburg. On this occasion this battalion of artillery was under the immediate command of Major J. W. Latimer, Major of said battalion.

Major Latimer moved the battalion from its camp near Chambersburg on the 1st July, and moving along the Chambersburg road appeared in front of Gettysburg just before dark of the same day. After dark, being in close proximity to the enemy, Major Latimer, making a detour to prevent the enemy from finding out his movements, moved his battalion to the extreme left of Gettysburg between the York and Baltimore roads facing the Cemetery Hills, when the command was parked and camped for the night. About 4 o'clock, the following morning, July 2d, Major Latimer having carefully examined the ground, had selected the only eligible position in his front. The ground offered very few advantages, and the Major found great difficulty in sheltering his horses and caissons. The hill which he selected brought him directly in front of the wooded mountain and a little to the left of the Cemetery Hills. All the guns, except two long range guns, had to be crowded on this small hill, which was not in our favor. About 4 o'clock Major Latimer received orders from yourself, as also from General Johnson, to take position and open on the enemy. Four-

teen guns of the battalion were then planted on this hill above mentioned. The two remaining guns, twenty-pound Parrots, were placed on an eminence in rear of the battalion with Captain Graham's battery. Captain Brown's battery occupied the right, Captain Carpenter's occupied the centre, while Captain Dement and Captain Raine, the latter with one section of his battery, took the left.

As soon as the Major opened the enemy replied with a well-directed fire from a superior number of guns, causing many casualties among officers, men and horses. This unequal contest was sustained by both the officers and men with great fortitude until near night. The enemy in the meantime planted some guns on the left, which partially enfiladed our batteries, which caused Captain Carpenter to suffer very severely. By this time two of Captain Dement's pieces had expended all their ammunition, and one caisson had been blown up. Captain Brown had a piece disabled and his detachment so reduced that he could work only two guns, and Captain Brown had been shot down. At this juncture, the enemy pouring a destructive fire upon them, Major Latimer sent his sergeant-major to General Johnson to say that owing to the exhausted state of his men and ammunition and the severe fire of the enemy, he was unable to hold his position any longer. General Johnson sent him word "to withdraw the battalion if he thought proper."

Most of the guns were then withdrawn, leaving four guns on the hill to repel any advance of the enemy's infantry. Soon after this Major Latimer again opened on the enemy with the four guns left in position, to cover the advance of our infantry, which drew a terrible fire upon him. And it was here that the accomplished and gallant Latimer was severely wounded in the arm, of which wound he has since died. The command then devolved upon Captain Raine, the senior captain of the battalion. Night coming on, Captain Raine, at Major Latimer's suggestion, withdrew the battalion a short distance and encamped for the night. The next morning, 3d July, the condition of the battalion was reported to you, when Captain Raine received orders to park near the ordnance train and to have his ammunition chests replenished, and await further orders. The same evening Captain Raine received orders to go to the front, which order was promptly obeyed. On the 4th Captain Raine fell back with his division near the Cashtown road, where he remained until our army left the front of Gettysburg. The list of casualties will show the severity of the conflict, and it is believed we did the enemy infinitely more damage than we sustained, for they had to change their positions frequently and had to be relieved by fresh

batteries, while our men stood unflinchingly to their posts the whole time.

I herewith furnish you with a list of the casualties in the different batteries:

Casualties in Captain Raine's battery—second section commanded by Captain Raine: One man severely wounded and left in enemy's lines, several others slightly wounded, but are now doing duty; three horses killed. First section—Lieutenant Hardwick commanding—three men severely wounded; axle-tree of No. 1 gun damaged by solid shot; the horses of this section were taken to the rear, and hence did not suffer.

Casualties in Captain Brown's battery: Captain Brown severely wounded; Lieutenant Roberts wounded; four men killed and ten wounded; nine horses killed or permanently disabled.

Casualties in Captain Dement's battery: One Corporal killed; four men wounded; nine horses killed or permanently disabled; one caisson exploded and one disabled.

Casualties in Captain Carpenter's battery: One Corporal killed; four men killed; one Sergeant wounded; one Corporal wounded; seventeen enlisted men badly wounded; several others very slightly wounded—now on duty; nine horses killed.

Summary: One Major severely wounded; one Captain severely wounded; one Lieutenant wounded; one non-commissioned officer and nine men killed; two non-commissioned officers wounded and thirty men wounded; thirty horses killed.

Major Latimer informed me that all officers, with the exception of Lieutenant John E. Plater, behaved with great gallantry. The Captains report that their officers, non-commissioned officers and men, behaved with such unparalleled gallantry that they can make no distinction.

I am, Colonel, your ob't serv't,

[Signed,]

R. SNOWDEN ANDREWS,

Lieutenant-Colonel Commanding Artillery Battalion.

Official: S. V. SOUTHALL,

Adjutant Artillery Second Corps.

General Kirby Smith's Campaign in Kentucky.**PAPER No. 5.**

By Major PAUL F. HAMMOND.

The army now occupied nearly the arc of a circle described from Perryville by Harrodsburg upon Versailles. Polk held the centre at Harrodsburg, with Heth on his immediate right, reaching to McCown's Ferry on the Kentucky river. Stevenson occupied Versailles on the extreme right, while Hardie on the left retired slowly upon Perryville, harassed at every step by the enemy. Marshall had come up from Owingsville within supporting distance.

Thus the main object of the late movements was accomplished with trifling loss of men or material. General Bragg's entire forces were now concentrated and well in hand, in a position of his own selection, and a fair field upon which to operate.

The enemy crossed the Kentucky river at Frankfort, and were ambuscaded, and severely handled by Colonel Scott, who, notwithstanding, was forced to give way before largely superior forces. General Bragg concluded that the main attack was coming from this quarter. It proved to be a great error, and unfortunately led him to violate a first principle of military science by dividing his army in the immediate face of the enemy, undoing in a moment all that the retreat, the sacrifices and the hard work of the last few days had accomplished. General Smith reinforced with Withers's division, raising his effective strength, exclusive of cavalry, to more than five and twenty thousand muskets, was sent in the direction of Frankfort to meet this attack, while General Bragg, with the remainder of his forces, some sixteen thousand men, was left to check the enemy at Perryville. Leaving the banks on the morning of the 8th of October, General Smith marched to Versailles, where he learned that only one column of the enemy, 10,000 strong, commanded by General Sill, had crossed at Frankfort, and that this column had taken the road for Lawrenceburg. In the hopes of capturing it, Smith proceeded rapidly to that point, while Withers, who was on the Salorsa turnpike, a few miles to our left, was ordered to make a detour still further to the left, which would bring him to Salt river, directly across Sill's line of march. If thus intercepted in front and pressed in rear by superior forces, Sill's command would inevitably be compelled to surrender. At ten o'clock at night General Smith encamped within a mile of Lawrenceburg.

whither he had moved with such secrecy and dispatch that neither the enemy nor the citizens dreamed of his proximity. Late in the night the enemy's trains could be heard rumbling along the streets of the town, and before dawn we moved forward, confident of seizing the prey. But Sill, without suspecting his danger, was making forced marches to join the main army, and instead of encamping near Lawrenceburg, as was anticipated, pushed on, though late at night, to Salt river. A few wagons and prisoners were captured, but the main column escaped, and our forces were withdrawn, and took the road at a quick-step for Harrodsburg. This was done with great chagrin, but circumstances made it imperative. It was now apparent that General Bragg was completely outwitted, or had deceived himself, and that he had fought at Perryville what, unhappily, proved to be the decisive battle of the campaign, with the smaller fraction of his army, while nearly 30,000 men were thirty miles away, in a futile chase after a supple and comparatively insignificant division of the enemy. There was little reason to hope that he had been successful, but on the contrary, very great cause to fear that he had suffered a disaster.

On the 8th of October the battle of Perryville was fought. Sixteen thousand Confederate soldiers held the field against a greatly superior force, and great credit was reflected upon our arms; but the victory, if victory could be claimed, was barren, while to achieve it a loss of 2,500 men was incurred.

General Smith entered Harrodsburg on the morning of the 10th. General Bragg was there, but his army had retired to Camp Dick Robinson, twelve miles in the rear. Bragg was in confident spirits, greatly elated by the gallantry which his soldiers had displayed upon the field of Perryville, he seemed fully determined to await the enemy at Harrodsburg.

At Cave City, at Bardstown, and at Frankfort, one advantage after another had faded away without profit, while the most fertile and friendly portions of Kentucky had been abandoned to the enemy. But again, at Harrodsburg fortune seemed to offer one last opportunity for the redemption of the State and the triumph of our cause.

The enemy were reported eight miles in front, steadily advancing. From early morning until noon, column after column of our army filed through the streets of Harrodsburg and wheeled into its appointed position, in line of battle. Through the cold, pelting rain, along the sloppy roads, the travel-worn veterans of the Army of Kentucky moved with the firm tread of conscious strength. Exhausted by a march of fifty miles in less than two days, the near prospect of battle seemed to

revive and refresh every soldier. There was no tumult, straggling, or noisy excitement, which is characteristic of raw troops on such occasion, but a stern and ominous silence, and perfect discipline were preserved in all the ranks. The light of battle gleamed in every eye, and the determination to conquer was written in the lineaments of every face.

No one who witnessed the scenes of that day can ever forget them, the immense stake at issue, and the soldierly bearing of the brave Southern army which was to contend for it, thrilled every heart.

The strength of the Confederate army at this time was about forty-eight thousand men,* with two hundred pieces of artillery. Of these thirty thousand were at Harrodsburg, between thirteen and fourteen thousand at Camp Dick Robinson, while Marshall's brigade, whose exact locality it was often difficult to ascertain, was somewhere between there and Lexington. This was exclusive of a large and excellent body of cavalry, comprising the brigades of Wheeler, Wharton, Scott, Morgan, Alston and Buford, numbering not less than ten thousand men.

It would be difficult to compute with any exactness the effective force

* It would be impossible to recall, at this distance of time, the exact dates at which the different bodies of Confederate troops entered the State of Kentucky, or their exact numbers. But the following table will show with sufficient accuracy the order in which our army crossed the Tennessee line, as well as the estimates of the infantry forces, as I obtained them at the time, by my somewhat petinacious enquiries, from General Pegram, who, although without official reports, was necessarily, from his position, obliged to keep well informed.

For fear of exaggeration I have rather reduced his estimates, as I now recall them :

1862.			
August	13, General Kirby Smith's column.....	6,000	
"	14, General Heth's division.....	3,000	
"	25, General Reynold's brigade.....	3,000	
September 6,	General Bragg's army.....	23,000	
"	7, Colonel Grace's regiment.....	600	
"	12, General Marshall's brigade.....	4,000	
"	18, General Stevenson's division.....	10,000	
"	28, Colonel Hilliard's legion.....	2,000	
October	1, General McCown with convalescents returning to their commands.....	1,600	
			53,200
Deduct for loss in killed and wounded at Richmond.....		500	
"	" " " " Perryville.....	2,500	
"	" " For sickness, &c., &c. (large estimate).....	2,000	
			5,000

And it will be seen that there was something more than forty-eight thousand infantry ready for battle when General Bragg determined to abandon the State.

of the enemy. Their prisoners claimed that their armies left Louisville ninety-five thousand strong. Of these more than three thousand were put *hors du combat* at Perryville; Dumont with five thousand was slowly advancing on Lexington, which we had abandoned, while Sill had just been driven in disorder, with the loss of several hundred prisoners, across Salt river, and could hardly join the main army in time or in condition to take part in the impending battle. When, in addition, it is remembered that this army was composed, to a great extent, of raw levies, hastily collected and organized, with little discipline, and unaccustomed to the march, and had been pushed forward from Louisville with great rapidity, on scant rations, through a badly watered country, a moderate allowance for stragglers, and the details necessary to guard its long line of communications, would reduce its effective strength of all arms below seventy thousand.

During the greater part of the day General Smith was occupied in choosing the battle-field, some two miles beyond Harrodsburg. The country is rolling and mostly cleared, and offered advantageous positions. In the afternoon General Bragg rode along the lines, making some slight alterations, and was enthusiastically cheered. At dusk he returned to Harrodsburg, and General Smith took quarters close to and a little outside of the lines. At midnight the enemy were reported within three-fourths of a mile, moving in force around our left, in such a manner as to require a change of front, for which the proper dispositions were promptly made. About 3 A. M. General Smith was sent for by Gen. Bragg, and remained in consultation with him till nearly daylight, at which hour, when every ear was pricked to catch the first notes of the coming storm, he returned with orders for an immediate and rapid retreat, and by sunrise not a Confederate soldier remained upon the field.

Thus at last were destroyed all the bright hopes with which fortune had so long tantalized us.

At Cave City, at Bardstown and Frankfort, great advantages were foregone. When it is recollected how much might have been gained at Perryville, the battle there can be regarded as little short of a disaster. But at Harrodsburg the campaign was finally abandoned, with the total defeat of all its prospects.

Two reasons were assigned for this retreat—one, the exhausted condition of the troops that had fought the battle of Perryville, the other the heavy movement of the enemy on our left flank, which threatened to intercept our line of retreat.

The army was concentrated and halted at Camp Dick Robinson in an impregnable position, formed by the junction of the Kentucky and Dick rivers.

One brilliant, though hazardous, movement remained, which offered a possibility of retrieving the failing fortunes of the campaign. The Kentucky river, rising in the southeastern portion of the State, flows in a northwesterly direction to Boonsboro, when, turning to the left, it sweeps around in a semi-circle to Frankfort, and pours thence directly into the Ohio.

Within this semi-circle are embraced the counties of Woodford, Fayette and Jessamine, which are regarded as the most fertile in the State, and contained supplies sufficient to subsist General Bragg's army for some time. By crossing into this Blue Grass region the easily defensible line of the Kentucky river could have been occupied. If the enemy attempted to cross at McCown's Ferry, or the fords between these and Richmond, he exposed his line of communications. At whatever fords he might attempt to cross, General Bragg, moving upon the shorter line, would have been able to concentrate a force which would render the passage impracticable. If the enemy retraced his steps, as in all probability he must have done, all that had heretofore been accomplished would have been lost, while General Bragg would have been offered the opportunity to attack him in flank and harass his rear, and ample time to recruit his own army, which was worn by its late arduous service. If, finally, it was found necessary to retreat, the Pound Gap route was safe in any event, and that by Cumberland Gap almost equally so, while supplies could have been collected and depots established along the line of retreat, sufficient, at least, to obviate the worst of the suffering which the troops subsequently endured. That this plan was suggested, if not debated, in a council of war, there is reason to believe; but General Bragg concluded to retreat at once; determined finally, it has been said, by the rumored defeat of Van Dorn at Corinth.

With four days' rations, on the morning of the 13th of October the army commenced to retreat to East Tennessee, which it would require not less than twelve days to accomplish. Bragg, in advance, took the route by Mount Vernon, with Smith to follow by Big Hill. It devolved upon him, who had opened the way into Kentucky, by his brilliant victory at Richmond, to command the rear and cover, and in the main conduct a retreat, which his judgment did not sanction. And this he did with skill, which surmounted difficulties of no ordinary char-

acter, and firmness and presence of mind maintained amid the most alarming dangers.

At Big Hill the road was obstructed for seven miles by wagons in great disorder. A semi-victorious army pressing heavily in the rear, a mountain in front, with the road across it blocked with wagons, were enough to strike almost any man with consternation. The Commanding General, with one-half of the army, was already so far ahead on a better road, that no assistance could be expected from him, while it was his trains mistaking their way, which placed us in our painful position. Calling his staff around him, in the gray mists of a gloomy morning, General Smith addressed them substantially as follows: "It is necessary for me, gentlemen, to call upon you for the exercise of all your energies. I consider my army in great danger. I am determined to save it, though I may be forced to destroy the trains. Park the wagons out of the road ready for burning, then move forward those which contain commissary and quartermasters' stores, but keep the road open for my troops."

A detail of 1,500 men was made from Heth's division, and fortunately, General Cleburn, a noble gentleman and gallant and skillful officer, twice wounded in Kentucky, at Richmond and at Perryville, happened there, and, although relieved from duty on account of his last wound, took charge of the working parties, and infused into them a portion of his wonderful energy. The soldiers lined the road on either side from the foot to the summit of this immense and rugged hill, and as the starved and tired mules faltered and fell, seized the wagons and lifted them by sheer force over the worst places. All day, and throughout the night and until noon the next day, the trains, in one unbroken stream, continued to pour over Big Hill, and then the troops followed.

We were now again in the region of bushwhackers, who were even more active than upon our entrance into the State. Their savage ferocity spared none who fell into their hands, and they audaciously fired upon the soldiers in their very camps. But, altogether, their hostility was rather serviceable than otherwise, as, in a great measure, it prevented straggling.

At Rockcastle river the danger appeared even more imminent than at Big Hill. The enemy's guns thundered on our right and almost in our front. Pressing closely upon General Bragg, it appeared to be his object to intercept General Smith at the junction of the routes near London. Bragg had already left his army under the command of General Polk, and was proceeding rapidly on the way to Knoxville and thence to Richmond. Smith communicated his perilous position to that officer,

and begged him to hold the enemy in check. With gallantry which has been so often conspicuous, General Polk replied that he would do his best, and the enemy should not pass. Buford's cavalry, guarding a road which intersected the line of retreat four miles from Rockcastle river, was scattered very soon after our columns passed, while all through the day the booming of cannon, with occasional rattle of musketry, could be heard from the neighborhood of London. But our brave soldiers held their ground with unflinching firmness, and the army was saved.

Here ended the pursuit. It is needless to recount the farther hardships of the retreat. They were such as an army marching through a mountainous country, without rations and shoes, and scantily clothed, at the verge of Winter, must necessarily suffer.

Finally, on the 24th of October the van of General Smith's army entered Knoxville. Under the trying circumstances of the retreat the entire army preserved admirable discipline and order, but at Knoxville many brave men who had taxed nature beyond the limits of her endurance, sank utterly prostrated. It was estimated that not less than 15,000 men went immediately into hospital.*

*I heard this estimate made by Dr. S. A. Smith, the Medical Director of the Army of East Tennessee, a careful man, not given to exaggeration.

A POEM,

BY MARY ASHLEY TOWNSEND,

Dedicated to the Army of Northern Virginia, New Orleans, May 10th, 1881, on the occasion of the unveiling of Stonewall Jackson's Statute which surmounts the tomb built to receive the dead who fought under him.

Comrades, halt! The field is chosen.
'Neath the skies of Southern May,
Where the Southern roses ripen,
We will bivouac to-day.
Here, no foe will draw our sabres
In the turbulence of war,
Nor will drum beat, nor will bugle
Wake the old pain in a scar.

All is rest, and calm—around us
Beauty's smile and manhood's prime;
Scents of Spring, like ships, go sailing
Balmy seas of summer time.

Flags of battle, hanging yonder,
Flutter not at strife's increase;
On their pulses lie the fingers
Of the Great Physician—Peace.

In the marble camp before us,
Silence paces to and fro—
Spectre of the din of battles
Hard fought in the long ago.
While he marches, from the meadows,
O'er the heights, around the curves;
Come the men of many combats—
Death's Grand Army of Reserves.

In the swift advancing columns,
Many a battle-blazoned name.
With Stuart, Ewell, Hays and Ashby,
Bears the honor cross of Fame.
Down the spectral line it flashes—
Glorious symbol of reward
Won when all the world was looking
Unto Lee and Beauregard.

From the war-graves of Manassas,
Fredericksburg and Malvern Hill;
Carrick's Ford and Massanutton,
Fast the shadowy legions fill.
From the far off Rappahannock,
From the red fields of Cross Keys,
Gettysburg—the Wildernesses—
From defeats and victories:

Tired trooper—weary marcher—
Grim and sturdy cannonier—
Veteran gray, and slender stripling,
Hasten to encamp them here.
From the mountain and the river,
From the city and the plain,
Sweeping down to join their leader—
STONEWALL JACKSON—once again.

There he stands: alive in granite!
By the hand of genius made
Once again to rise before us,
Waiting for his "Old Brigade."
Chieftain—Hero—Christian—Soldier—
King of men, and man of God!
Crystallized about his footsteps,
Greatness marks the path he trod.

Soldiers! Ye who fought with Jackson
 Through the days and nights of strife;
 Bringing from the fields of battle
 But the bitter lees of life:
 Ye whose lips have only tasted
 Ashen apples from the fray;
 Every wound ye won beside him,
 Knights ye on this field to-day.

Army of our old Virginia!
 Would ye write a legend here,
 That shall win from friend and foe-man,
 Honors' reverential tear?
 Trace ye then upon this marble,
 With imperishable pen,
 Words that shout their own hosannas,
 STONEWALL JACKSON AND HIS MEN!

Winchester and Fisher's Hill—Letter from General Early to General Lee.

HEADQUARTERS V. D., October 9th, 1864,
 (New Market.)

General R. E. Lee:

GENERAL,—In advance of a detailed report, I have determined to give you an informal account of the recent disasters to my command, which I have not had leisure to do before.

On the 17th of September I moved two divisions—Rodes's and Gordon's—from Stevenson's Depot, where they, together with Breckenridge's division, were encamped (Ramseur being at Winchester, to cover the road from Berryville) to Bunker Hill, and on the 18th I moved Gordon's division, with a part of Lomax's cavalry, to Martinsburg, to thwart efforts that were reported to be making to repair the Baltimore & Ohio railroad. This expedition was successful, and the bridge over Back Creek was burned by a brigade of cavalry sent there. On the evening of the 18th Rodes was moved back to Stevenson's Depot and Gordon to Bunker Hill, with orders to start at daylight to return to his camp at Stevenson's Depot, which place he reached at a very early hour next morning. About the time of Gordon's arrival on that morning, firing was heard in Ramseur's front, and now a report reached me that the enemy's cavalry had appeared on the Berryville road. I ordered Rodes, Gordon and Breckenridge to have their divisions under

arms, ready to move to Ramseur's assistance, and rode to his position to ascertain the extent and character of the demonstration. On getting there I found Ramseur's division in line of battle, and the enemy evidently advancing with his whole force. The other divisions were immediately ordered up and the trains all put in motion for their security. Rodes and Gordon arrived just before the enemy commenced advancing a heavy fire on Ramseur's left for the purpose of overwhelming him, and when their columns commenced advancing on Ramseur, I attacked them with Rodes's and Gordon's divisions, and drove them back with great slaughter—the artillery doing most splendid service. Braxton's battalion driving back with canister, a heavy force, before which Evans's brigade, of Gordon's division, which was on the left, had given way. This brigade was now rallied, and Battle's brigade coming to its assistance, the enemy was pushed back a considerable distance, and we were successful. Breckenridge's division did not arrive for some time, because General Breckenridge had moved it out, after my order to him, to drive back some of the enemy's cavalry, which was crossing the Opequon, and I sent for him again, and he came up in the afternoon, before the enemy had made any further attack; but as he reported the enemy's cavalry advancing on the road from Charlestown by Burntown and Stevenson's depot, I ordered one of his brigades to the left on that road, and directed General Fitz Lee to take charge of all the cavalry on that flank (my left) and check the enemy's cavalry, and moved the other two brigades of Breckenridge's division towards the right, where our forces were weakest and the enemy was making demonstrations in force.

Breckenridge was scarcely in position before our cavalry on the left was discovered coming back in great confusion followed by the enemy's, and Breckenridge's force was ordered to the left to repel this cavalry force, which had gotten in rear of my left, and this with the assistance of the artillery he succeeded in doing. But as soon as the firing was heard in rear of our left flank the infantry commenced falling back along the whole line, and it was very difficult to stop them. I succeeded, however in stopping enough of them in the old rifle pits, constructed by General Johnston, to arrest the progress of the enemy's infantry, which commenced advancing again, when the confusion in our ranks was discovered, and would have still won the day if our cavalry would have stopped the enemy's, but so overwhelming was the battle and so demoralized was the larger part of ours, that no assistance was received from it. The enemy's cavalry again charged around my left flank and the men began to give way again, so that it was necessary for me to retire through the town.

Line of battle was formed on the north side of the town, the command reorganized, and we then turned back deliberately to Newtown, and the next day to Fisher's Hill. We lost three pieces of artillery, two of which had been left with the cavalry on the left, and the other was lost because the horses were killed, and it could not be brought off. In this fight I had already defeated the enemy's infantry, and could have continued to do so, but the enemy's very great superiority in cavalry, and the comparative inefficiency of ours, turned the scales against us. In this battle the loss in the infantry and artillery was—killed, 226; wounded, 1,567; missing, 1,818; total, 3,611. There is no full report of the cavalry, but the total loss in killed and wounded from September 1st to 1st October, is—killed, 60; wounded, 288; total, 348; but many were captured, though a good many are missing as stragglers, and a number of them reported missing in the infantry were not captured, but are stragglers and skulkers. Wharton's (Breckenridge's) division lost six colors, and Rodes's division captured two. Rodes's division made a very gallant charge, and he was killed conducting it. I fell back to Fisher's hill, as it was the only place where a stand could be made, and I was compelled to detach Fitz. Lee's cavalry to the Luray valley to hold the enemy's cavalry in check should it advance up that valley. The enemy's loss at Winchester was very heavy. Dr. McGuire has received a letter from a member of his family, who states that 5,800 of the enemy's wounded were brought to the hospital at Winchester, and that the total wounded was between 6,000 and 7,000, and a gentleman who passed over the field says that the number of killed was very large. Sheridan's Medical Director informed one of our Surgeons, left at Woodstock, that the number of wounded in hospital at Winchester was the same as stated in the letter to Dr. McGuire, and I am satisfied from what I saw that the enemy's loss was very heavy.

The enemy's infantry force was nearly, if not quite, three times as large as mine, and his cavalry was very much superior, both in numbers and equipment. This I have learned from intelligent persons who have seen the whole of both forces. I posted my troops in line at Fisher's Hill, with the hope of arresting Sheridan's progress, but my line was very thin, and having discovered that the position could be flanked, as is the case with every position in the Valley, I had determined to fall back on the night of the 22nd, but late that evening a heavy force was moved under cover of the woods on the left, and drove back the cavalry there posted, and got in the rear of my right flank, and when I tried to remedy this the infantry got into a panic and gave way in confusion, and I found it impossible to rally it. The artillery behaved

splendidly, both on this occasion and at Winchester. I had to order the guns to be withdrawn, but the difficulties of the ground were such that twelve guns were lost because they could not be gotten off. The loss in the infantry and artillery was 30 killed, 210 wounded, and 995 missing; total, 1235. I have been able to get no report of the loss in the cavalry, but it was slight. Very many of the missing in the infantry took to the mountains. A number of them have since come in, and others are still out. The enemy did not capture more than four or five hundred, but I am sorry to say many men threw away their arms. The night favored our retreat, and by next morning the commands were pretty well organized. At Mount Jackson, next day, I halted, and drove back a force of cavalry, which was pursuing, and then moved to Rude's Hill, where I halted, until the enemy's infantry came up next day, and was trying to flank me, when I moved off in line of battle for eight miles, occasionally halting to check the enemy. This continued until nearly sundown, when I got a position, at which I checked the enemy's further progress for that day, and then moved under cover of night towards Port Republic, to unite with Kershaw. After doing this I drove a division of cavalry from my front at Port Republic, and then moved to Waynesboro', where two divisions under Torbert were destroying the bridge, and drove them away; and after remaining there one day I moved to the vicinity of Mount Crawford, where I awaited the arrival of Rosser's brigade to take the offensive, but before it arrived the enemy was discovered to be falling back. On the morning of the 6th I immediately commenced following the enemy, and arrived here on the 7th, and have been waiting to ascertain whether Sheridan intends crossing the Blue Ridge before moving further.

Respectfully,

J. A. EARLY, *Lieutenant-General.*

Official: SAM'L W. MELTON,

Lieutenant-Colonel and A. A. G.

Reminiscences of the Army of Northern Virginia.

By J. WILLIAM JONES.

PAPER NO. 9.

CEDAR RUN (SLAUGHTER'S MOUNTAIN.)

After the seven days' battles around Richmond we had a brief season of rest, which was greatly enjoyed after the marches, hardships and

dangers which we had encountered. But soon the "Foot Cavalry" began to loathe the swamps of the Chickahominy, and sigh for the green fields, fresh breezes, clear streams, buttermilk, and apple-butter of the mountains. They were soon to be gratified.

"The situation" was one of difficulty, and would have greatly perplexed a less sagacious and determined leader than General Lee. McClellan was strongly intrenched at Harrison's Landing, and it was uncertain whether he would advance against Richmond by the north side—cross the river and move on Petersburg—or join the forces which General Pope was collecting in Culpeper. The arrival of this latter General from the West and his assuming command of the "Army of Virginia" was heralded in all of the Northern papers. He came up to his headquarters on a special train decked with flags, streamers and flowers. He had issued his famous order, which afterwards proved so prophetic that I quote it in full, as follows:

"WASHINGTON, July 14, 1862.

"To the officers and soldiers of the Army of Virginia:

"By special assignment of the President of the United States, I have assumed command of this army. I have spent two weeks in learning your whereabouts, your condition and your wants, in preparing you for active operations, and in placing you in position from which you can act promptly and to the purpose. *I have come from the West, where we have always seen the backs of our enemies, from an army whose business it has been to seek the adversary and to beat him when found, whose policy has been attack and not defense.* In but one instance has the enemy been able to place our Western army in a defensive attitude. I presume I have been called here to pursue the same system, and to lead you against the enemy. It is my purpose to do so, and that speedily. I am sure you long for an opportunity to win the distinction you are capable of achieving. That opportunity I shall endeavor to give you. Meantime I desire you to dismiss from your minds certain phrases which I am sorry to find much in vogue among you. I constantly hear of taking strong positions and holding them, of lines of retreat, and bases of supplies. Let us dismiss such ideas. *The strongest position a soldier should desire to occupy is one from which he can easily advance against the enemy. Let us study the probable lines of retreat of our opponents and leave our own to take care of themselves. Let us look before and not behind. Success and glory are in the advance; disaster and shame lurk in the rear.* Let us act on this understanding, and it is safe

to predict that your banners shall be inscribed with many a glorious deed and that your names will be dear to your countrymen forever. .

"JOHN POPE,

"Major-General Commanding."

This order was copied into the Richmond papers, and was at once the object of jibes and jests, which became more and more pointed as the campaign progressed.

But he issued other orders directing his men "to live on the country," holding citizens of his district responsible for the acts of "bush-whackers," requiring citizens to take the oath of allegiance to the United States Government, move out of his lines, or be treated as spies, and others of like import, which inaugurated a system of pillage, plunder and outrage which excited the burning indignation of our press, and made the army eager to be led against this new hero, whose "head-quarters," he said, were "in the saddle."

When, therefore, on the 17th July, 1862, we broke camp near Richmond and the head of our column moved toward the mountains, the "Foot Cavalry" started off with their old swing and cheers rang along our lines. General Lee had sent Jackson with his own and Ewell's divisions to Gordonsville for the purpose of watching and checking the movements of Pope until McClellan should develop his purpose. We reached Gordonsville on the evening of the 19th July, and found in the vicinage abundant pasturage for our jaded animals, beautiful camps for the troops, and the warmest hospitality on the part of the people.

I had opportunity at this time of seeing a good deal of General Jackson—sometimes at his headquarters, sometimes in the hospitable homes of the people, and frequently at preaching—and was more than ever impressed with his genius as a soldier and his high qualities as a man. Just before the march to Cedar Run I was called to his headquarters to give him information concerning the roads between the Rapidan and Louisa Courthouse. I had been familiar with these roads from my boyhood, and thought I knew them thoroughly. But when "Old Jack" begun to question me about the streams, and hills, and cross-roads, and bridle-paths, and showed the most perfect familiarity with them, I had to say: "I thought I knew all about that country, General; but I can give you no information, as you evidently know more about it than I do."

I remember being very much amused at seeing him several times fast asleep at preaching, and at hearing General Ewell ask one day: "What is the use of General Jackson's going to church? He sleeps all of the

time." One day a visitor alluded to Pope's orders, and said: "Well, General, here is a new candidate for your favor." "Yes, and by God's blessing he shall receive my attention," was the quiet reply.

A. P. Hill's splendid "Light Division" had been sent up to join us, and on the 2d of August there was a sharp cavalry fight in the streets of Orange Courthouse, between Colonel W. E. Jones and a strong reconnoitering force which Pope had sent across the Rapidan. Learning that Pope's line was considerably extended, Jackson determined to strike his centre at Culpeper Courthouse before he could concentrate his whole force. Accordingly, we broke camp on the afternoon of August 7th, it being Jackson's purpose to reach Culpeper Courthouse very early on the morning of the 9th. But by some misconception of orders A. P. Hill only crossed the Rapidan on the 9th, and Jackson thus encountered the enemy eight miles short of his objective point. It was on this march that his negro servant Jim told some officers who were inquiring about "Old Jack's" habits: "Yes, the General is a great man for praying at all times. But when I see him get up a great many times in the night to pray, *then I know there is going to be something to pay*, and I go straight and pack his haversack, because I know he will call for it in the mornin'."

I have a very vivid recollection of that march—the enthusiasm with which the men cheered "Old Jack" as he rode to the front, the joy with which the people hailed us as their deliverers from the reign of terror which Pope's orders had inaugurated, and the impatience of the men at the slow advance of our column, as the roads were obstructed by the Federal cavalry, who kept up a constant skirmish with our advance guard.

Ewell's division led the advance, and as Early's brigade was in front, and my own regiment (the Thirteenth Virginia Infantry) in advance of the brigade, I had a fine opportunity of witnessing the maneuvering for position and the skirmishing. A little after 12 o'clock our brigade was halted at a school-house on the road, eight miles from Culpeper Courthouse, near Slaughter's Mountain, and not far from Cedar Run. Some time was spent in reconnoitering the position of the enemy, and bringing our own troops into position.

There was some sharp controversy at the time between General Pope and General Banks as to who was responsible for bringing on that battle; but if those gentlemen have not yet settled it satisfactorily, I would advise them to call General Early to the stand, and he would testify that neither Pope nor Banks was the responsible party, but that Early himself brought on the fight by direct orders from Jackson.

I happened to be near General Early when Captain A. S. Pendleton, a gallant officer of Jackson's staff, rode up, gave the military salute, and said: "General Jackson sends his compliments to General Early, and says that he must advance on the enemy, and he will be supported by General Winder." The prompt reply, drawled out in earnest tones, was: "Give my compliments to General Jackson, and tell him I will do it."

The situation at this moment was as follows: The other two brigades of Ewell's division were supporting batteries splendidly posted on Slaughter's Mountain; Winder, commanding Jackson's old division, was moving in column along the main road to support Early, and A. P. Hill was coming on to Winder's support. General Banks commanded the Federal forces, which consisted of his own corps, and Rickett's division of McDowell's corps, actually engaged, and numbering about seventeen thousand men, with large reinforcements rapidly approaching. Jackson's entire force numbered 18,623 men, but they were veterans, flushed with victory, and eager to meet their old friends of the Valley campaign, and to give their new friend, General Pope, an opportunity of seeing something else save the backs of the enemy.

As soon as General Early received Jackson's order, he called for eight picked men of the Thirteenth Virginia, whom he sent forward as scouts, threw that splendid regiment into skirmish line, and advanced his brigade (consisting of the Forty-ninth Virginia, Fifty-second Virginia, Fifty-eighth Virginia, Thirty-first Virginia, Twenty-fifth Virginia, Thirteenth Virginia and Twelfth Georgia) across a field to the left of the road to the cover of a small body of woods, behind which he very carefully formed his line of battle, while the Thirteenth Virginia advanced as skirmishers a little way into the woods. Presently Colonel Walker, of the Thirteenth, called back in his ringing voice: "General Early, are you ready?" "Yes; go on," was the reply, and soon after there was sharp skirmishing, which presently gave place to the roar of battle.

Soon after the opening of the fight some one suggested to the surgeons, chaplains, &c., of the brigade that by riding up on the hill to the right we would have a better view of the field, and could also see when our services were needed by the wounded.

Accordingly we rode up and had a splendid panoramic view of the whole scene. Banks's line of battle, his artillery in position, and his splendidly appointed cavalry seemingly preparing for a charge; Ewell's two brigades on the mountain and his batteries superbly served; Early's brigade moving in line of battle on the enemy with the precision of

dress-parade; Winder deploying his troops to support Early, and A. P. Hill hurrying up in column—all combined to form a battle picture of a grandeur rarely witnessed. We had been joined by some citizens and a number of straggling cavalymen, and our party formed a considerable group, who were reveling in the splendid panorama when our enjoyment was brought to a very sudden termination. A Federal battery, probably mistaking us for some General and his staff, galloped into position within easy range, and opened fire upon us with six pieces as hard as they could drive. At first the missiles fell short, but they would doubtless soon get the exact range, and we suddenly discovered that we had important duties elsewhere.

Without considering "the order of our going" we galloped down the hill to the cover of the woods. A negro servant of one of our surgeons happened to be mounted on the doctor's best horse, and led the party. As we called a halt and gathered together again the doctor began to upbraid the boy for "being so much frightened and riding his horse so hard." The negro meekly replied: "Doctor, I don't love the whizzing of dem ar things any better then you do sah. *'Sides, I don't think you orter blame me 'cause my horse kin beat yours a runnin'.*"

A roar of laughter greeted this sally, for it was perfectly evident that each man had done his "level best" in getting away from "the whizzing of dem ar things."

Meantime the battle raged furiously. Hastening towards the front, I saw the bleeding, mangled form of the gallant Winder, who was mortally wounded just as he was putting in his division and skillfully directing the fire of Poague's and Carpenter's batteries. A West Point officer of rare merit, General C. S. Winder had succeeded General Garnett in the command of the "Stonewall" brigade, was now in command of the old "Stonewall" division, and had already won a reputation which opened before him a most brilliant career. Jackson said of him in his official report:

"It is difficult within the proper reserve of an official report to do justice to the merits of this accomplished officer. Urged by the Medical Director to take no part in the movements of the day, because of the enfeebled state of his health, his ardent patriotism and military pride could bear no such restraint. Richly endowed with those qualities of mind and person which fit an officer for command, and which attract the admiration and excite the enthusiasm of his troops, he was rapidly rising to the front rank of his profession. His loss has been severely felt."

General Winder lived only three hours after he fell, and died mourned by the whole army.

At five o'clock in the evening the crisis of the struggle came by the advance of the Federal infantry to turn Early's right flank, and that being defeated by the opportune arrival of Thomas's Georgia brigade of A. P. Hill's division, a still more formidable attack was made on the left. The second Virginia brigade, Taliaferro's brigade, and half of Early's brigade were driven back in confusion, and a great disaster seemed inevitable. But Colonel Lindsay Walker's artillery-men stood to their guns and used grape and canister with terrific effect; Colonel J. A. Walker and his famous old Thirteenth Virginia stood as firm as a rock; a part of the Thirty-first Virginia stood by them; General Early held firmly the troops under his immediate eye, and at the supreme crisis Jackson himself dashed upon the field, the very personification of the genius of battle, and rallied his broken legions with magic words and heroic examples. Drawing his sword (for the first time during the war), he shouted out in clear ringing tones which were heard above the roar of the battle: "Rally, brave men, and press forward! Your General will lead you! Jackson will lead you! Follow me!" His presence acted like a charm; his officers caught the inspiration; the fugitives rallied at once around the heroic nucleus formed by Colonel Walker with the Thirteenth Virginia, the "Stonewall" brigade, came forward in in gallant style, A. P. Hill sent in Branch's brigade of brave North Carolinians, the enemy was repulsed, and the disaster turned into victory. Just at this point in the battle I witnessed the charge of a magnificent column of Federal cavalry, who came forward in a style which excited our highest admiration, and deserved a better fate, for Branch's men repulsed them in front, while Walker threw the Thirteenth Virginia behind a fence and delivered, as they galloped back, a withering fire at very short range, which emptied many a saddle.

Jackson now hurried up Pender's and Archer's brigades of A. P. Hill's division, advanced Ewell from the mountain, threw forward his whole line, and, when night put an end to the contest, had driven the enemy two miles, holding the whole battle-field, the enemy's dead and many of his wounded falling into our hands. Jackson had no idea of stopping short of Culpeper Courthouse, and I know personally the fact that guides were detailed from the "Culpeper Minute Men" of my regiment to conduct his columns on the proposed night march. But the night proved very dark, the cavalry brought information that Banks was receiving heavy reinforcements, and Jackson very reluctantly decided to wait for the morning. The next morning General J.

E. B. Stuart reached the army "on a tour of inspection" (it is shrewdly suspected that "Jeb" had "snuffed the battle from afar," and had come to claim the privilege of going in), and at the request of Jackson made a reconnoissance which fully developed the fact that Pope had already received large reinforcements, and that others were rapidly coming forward. Jackson determined therefore, to await the attack from the enemy; and we spent the 10th in looking after our wounded, burying our dead, and collecting arms, ammunition, &c., from the battlefield. Old "Stonewall" announced his victory by the following characteristic dispatch:

"AUGUST 11th—6½ A. M.

"On the evening of the 9th instant God blessed our arms with another victory. The battle was near Cedar Run, about six miles from Culpeper Courthouse. The enemy, according to statements of prisoners, consisted of Banks's, McDowell's and Sigel's commands. We have over four hundred prisoners, including Brigadier-General Prince. While our list of killed is less than that of the enemy, we have to mourn the loss of some of our best officers and men. * * * We have collected about one thousand five hundred small arms and other ordnance stores."

On the morning of the 11th General Banks asked for a truce to enable him to bury his dead. The request was granted, and as Early's brigade on our side had charge of it, I had full opportunity of witnessing the scene, which was indeed a novel one.

That night we deliberately moved back toward the Rapidan, and as my brigade brought up the rear, I can testify of my own knowledge that the "hot pursuit" by the Federals, and "rapid retreat of the rebels," about which General Pope telegraphed his Government, were as complete romances as that famous dispatch, purporting to come from General Pope, announcing the capture of ten thousand of Beauregard's army on his retreat from Corinth. [General Pope two years afterward denied that he ever sent such a dispatch, and claimed that it was manufactured by General Halleck.] I never saw a more leisurely march than we made on our return, and if there was any "hot pursuit" our rear guard did not hear of it. The fact was that "Old Jack" gained a splendid victory at Cedar Run (Slaughter's Mountain), and learning that the enemy had received large reinforcements he waited two days for an attack, and then marched leisurely back across the Rapidan to await the coming of General Lee. Some incidents of the battle may be

given. There was in one of the regiments a Quartermaster who was noted for his elegant uniform and splendid trappings. During the progress of the fight this gentleman rode up on Slaughter's Mountain, where he was spied by rough old Ewell, who thus accosted him: "I say, you man with the fine clothes on! Who are you, and where do you belong?" Being informed, with all possible dignity, that he was "Captain ———, Quartermaster of the ——— Virginia regiment," the grim old soldier threw up both hands and exclaimed: "Great heavens! a Quartermaster on a battle-field; who ever heard of such a thing before? But as you are here I will make you useful as well as ornamental," and thereupon he sent him with a message which carried him under very heavy fire. The gallant Quartermaster carried the message and brought the answer, but says that he soon after discovered that his train needed looking after, and never ventured near General Ewell during a battle again.

Another gallant Quartermaster, Major J. G. Field, of General A. P. Hill's staff, rendered most important service, going, as was his wont, into the thickest of the fight, until he was severely wounded. His wound caused the loss of his leg, but he returned after a short absence to render valuable service until the surrender, and recently filled with ability the office of Attorney-General of Virginia.

When our men found out from prisoners that General Banks commanded the opposing forces, they raised the shout: "Get your requisitions ready, boys! Put down everything you want! Old 'Stonewall's Quartermaster' has come with a full supply for issue!"

I saw A. P. Hill that day as he was putting his "Light Division" into battle, and was very much struck with his appearance. In his shirt-sleeves and with drawn sword he sought to arrest the stragglers who were coming to the rear, and seeing a Lieutenant in the number, he rode at him and fiercely inquired: "Who are you, sir, and where are you going?" The trembling Lieutenant replied: "I am going back with my wounded friend." Hill reached down and tore the insignia of rank from his collar as he roughly said: "You are a pretty fellow to hold a commission—deserting your colors in the presence of the enemy, and going to the rear with a man who is scarcely badly enough wounded to go himself. I reduce you to the ranks, sir, and if you do not go to the front and do your duty, I'll have you shot as soon as I can spare a file of men for the purpose." And then clearing the road, he hurried forward his men to the splendid service which was before them.

I have not left myself space to give a full sketch of the truce, but

may say that the contrast between Early and Milroy—the mingling together of “the blue” and “the gray” in friendly converse or sharp trades, and the animated discussions between the two parties—would make a chapter of great interest.

I rode out on the neutral ground with a brother Chaplain with no purpose whatever of any discussion of the points at issue in the great contest; but we soon found ourselves surrounded by groups of the “boys in blue,” and before we knew it were engaged in a sharp discussion of of various matters pertaining to the war. Then we got on the different battles, ending with Cedar Run. A Colonel with whom I was talking finally pulled out his pocket-book and offered to bet me \$100 that “in less than twenty-four hours Jackson would be in full retreat on Richmond and Pope in close pursuit.” I replied: “I cannot take your bet, Colonel, for several reasons. In the first place, I do not bet at all; in the second place, I have not \$100 about me; and, in the third place, it would be very difficult to find a stake-holder who would be satisfactory to both parties; but we shall see what we shall see.”

During the campaign of second Manassas I one day met a long column of prisoners going to the rear, and was surprised to see among them my friend, the Colonel. He at once recognized me, and pleasantly called out: “I say, Chaplain, ain’t you sorry now that you did not take my bet?” “Well! no Colonel,” I replied, “I think you will probably need all of your spare cash now. But if you will excuse me for anything which may squint toward exultation over a prisoner, I would like to ask you if you do not think Stonewall Jackson has chosen a singular route by which to retreat on Richmond, and if you do not regard Pope’s close pursuit as rather erratic?” He frankly owned up; we had a pleasant chat together; I shared my rations with him, and, as we parted, he said, “If you ever make up your mind to bet, Chaplain, you may bet your bottom dollar that I will never offer to bet again on any movement where Pope is in command on our side and Lee and Jackson on the other.”

On the 14th of August we had, by Jackson’s orders, deeply interesting thanksgiving services in the army.

The battle of Cedar Run caused General Pope to pause in his career of “seeing the backs of the enemy,” and we rested undisturbed in our beautiful camps until General Lee came with the rest of the army, and we started on that brilliant campaign by which “Headquarters in the Saddle” were summarily dismounted by the “foot cavalry” and their gallant comrades, and General Fitz John Porter made the scapegoat of Pope’s blunders.

A Reminiscence of an Official Interview with General R. E. Lee.

By J. WM. JONES.

In a lot of old war newspapers sent the other day to the office of the Society, I found an order which recalled one of the most pleasant interviews I ever had with our grand old chief—General Lee—and which I have long searched for in vain, as I desired to preserve it.

At one of the meetings of our Chaplains' Association, held at Orange Courthouse, Rev. B. T. Lacy and myself were appointed a committee to interview General Lee in reference to the custom of some officers of using the Sabbath for drills and parades, and of choosing such hours for these exercises as to interfere very seriously with the religious services of the day.

The old hero received us very kindly, entered fully into the spirit of our mission, and as the result of the interview issued the following order:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
February 7th, 1864.

GENERAL ORDER, }
No. 15. }

I. The attention of the army has already been called to the obligation of a proper observance of the Sabbath, but the sense of its importance, not only as a moral and religious duty, but as contributing to the personal health and well-being of the troops, induces the Commanding-General to repeat the orders on that subject. He has learned with great pleasure that in many brigades convenient houses of worship have been erected, and earnestly desires that every facility consistent with the requirements of discipline shall be afforded the men to assemble themselves together for the purpose of devotion.

II. To this end he directs that none but duties strictly necessary shall be required to be performed on Sunday, and that the labor, both of men and animals, which it is practicable to anticipate or postpone, or the immediate performance of which is not essential to the safety, health, or comfort of the army, shall be suspended on that day.

III. Commanding officers will require the usual inspections on Sunday to be held at such time as not to interfere with the attendance of the men on divine service at the customary hour in the morning.

They will also give their attention to the maintenance of order and quiet around the place of worship, and prohibit anything that may tend to disturb or interrupt religious exercises.

R. E. LEE, *General.*

I have a very vivid recollection of the interest he manifested in what we told him of the great revival which was making well nigh every camp vocal with the praises of God, and of the emphatic expressions of delight to which he gave utterance. And when Dr. Lacy said to him, "General, the chaplains of this army have a warm affection for you personally, and a deep interest in your welfare, and many of their most fervent prayers are offered in your behalf," his face flushed, his eyes were moistened, and with deep emotion he replied, "I heartily thank them for that. And I can only say that I am a poor sinner, trusting in Christ alone for salvation, and needing all of the prayers they can offer for me."

At our invitation he afterwards attended several meetings of our 'Chaplains' Association, and manifested the liveliest interest in the proceedings.

Notes and Queries.

How Many Confederate Towns did the Enemy Burn During the War ?

As General Sherman chose to raise some time ago the question of the "Conduct of the War," and to try to make it appear that the Federals were humane and civilized, and the Confederates cruel and barbarous—as Northern "historians" are accustomed to write in the same strain—and as even some of our own people, in their eager desire for peace and fraternity, seemed disposed to smooth over the matter and admit that one side was about as bad as the other, we propose to vindicate the truth of history and bring out some of the orders issued on both sides, and some of the details of their execution. We shall not allow the fair name of our people to be smirched without an indignant protest. Meantime we are glad to print the following from our friend, Rev. Horace E. Hayden, of Wilkes-Barre, Pa. :

Editor Southern Historical Society Papers :

Reverend and Dear Sir,—While the burning of the City of Columbia, S. C., by General W. T. Sherman of the U. S. Army is still fresh in the memory of your readers, is there not some one, with material at hand who can give through your pages, some account of the various actions of the same kind, committed by the Federal troops during our late War for Independence?

Chambersburg Penn., was burned July 30th, 1864, by orders of General Early in retaliation for the destruction by General Hunter of the public buildings and private houses at Lexington, Va., and elsewhere during his infamous raid to Lynchburg. Columbia was burned from pure revenge. The heart-rending accounts of the destruction of Chambersburg are only exceeded by the terrible sufferings of the impoverished and homeless people of Columbia. Chambersburg was the *only* town destroyed by the Confederates, and that was done for a specific purpose. The record on the other side is in fearful contrast.

In 1862 the following towns within the limits of the Confederate States were burned in whole or in part by the Federal army: Fredericksburg, Va.; Williamstown, N. C.; Hamilton, N. C.; Donaldsonville, Louisiana; Simsport, Louisiana.

In February, 1864, during the march of Sherman (whose military career was a success only so far as he destroyed property, for he never won a battle) from Vicksburg to Meridian, Miss., with 26,000 men, the following towns were burned in whole or in part: Meridian, Miss.; Canton, Miss.; Okalona, Miss. Contrast with this, the action of the Confederate army, as they invaded and retired from Pennsylvania without plunder. In this march of Sherman's to Meridian, he burned 10,000 bales of cotton, 2,000,000 bushels of corn, stole 8,000 slaves, and, according to a Federal writer, destroyed \$50,000,000 worth of property, making thousands homeless and destitute. This was five months before Chambersburg felt the keen edge of the war. The burning at Lexington, Va., was six weeks before Chambersburg was destroyed.

It is stated, on good authority, that during the march through South Carolina, in which Sherman burned Columbia, the following towns in South Carolina were burned in whole or in part by his troops, without there being any cotton in them to give a colouring to a charge against the Confederates of having committed the vandalism: Robertville, Gramsenville, McPhersonville, Blackville, Barnwell, Orangeburg, Lexington, Winsboro, Camden, Lancaster, Chesterfield, Cheraw, Darlington, Charleston.

In November, 1864, Sherman destroyed Atlanta and Rome, Ga.

Had I the material at hand I would not ask that another should work up this interesting page in our Confederate war; but I am too far from the archives. I hope some of the facile writers who have added to your pages and who have the archives near by, may tell us how many more towns were burned by the Federal forces and the circumstances of the destruction of *all* that thus fell into the hands of the enemy.

HORACE EDWIN HAYDEN.

Did the Confederates ever capture a Flag of the Regular Army?

The following seems to us an incredible statement, and we give it, that we may secure replies from those in position to know the facts:

"Admiral Preble says in his history of the flag: 'I am informed from the War Department, Washington, there is no record of any flags or flag having been captured by the rebels from the regiments in the Regular Army, and it is believed that none were captured by them.'"

EDITORIAL PARAGRAPHS.

THE REUNION AND BANQUET OF THE SOCIETY OF CONFEDERATE STATES ARMY AND NAVY IN THE STATE OF MARYLAND, came off at the Eutaw House, Baltimore, on the night of February 21st, and was a really magnificent affair. The beautiful tables groaned beneath all of the delicacies of the season, sweet music enlivened the occasion, the committee in charge and the Maryland soldiers generally were all attention and courtesy to their guests, the speeches seemed to be heartily enjoyed, and the mingling together of old comrades a delightful recalling of the hallowed memories of the brave old days of '61-'65.

The regular toasts were as follows:

1. *The Army and Navy of the Confederate States.* This was responded to in an eloquent and effective speech by Hon. Charles E. Hooker, of Mississippi, whose empty sleeve gave touching testimony to the faithfulness with which he served as a private soldier in the Army of Northern Virginia. He was loudly applauded.
2. *"Our Cavalry."* As General W. H. F. Lee rose to respond to this toast he was greeted with enthusiastic cheers, frequently repeated as he proceeded to make the speech of the occasion. After expressing his pleasure at meeting old comrades, General Lee said that it was quite probable that he was too partial to the cavalry, since it had been his proud privilege to "follow the feather" of "Jeb" Stuart and the leadership of Wade Hampton on so many glorious fields.

He remembered the jibes at the cavalry in which the infantry used to delight; but he thought a full answer to them all was the unanimity with which the infantry claimed that the battle of Gettysburg was lost *because the cavalry was not up in time*. But pleasantry aside, he desired to say that the artillery, infantry, and cavalry of the Army of Northern Virginia had alike done their duty and won their share of the glory of that grand old army. He desired to speak not as a cavalryman but as a Confederate, and to express his highest appreciation of the importance and value of these reunions. We have kept inviolate our paroles—we have no purpose of renewing the war—we do not expect to vote pensions to even needy Confederates—to decorate the graves of our dead at the public expense—or to tax the people to establish "homes" for our maimed veterans. But it does behoove us to see to it that the graves of our dead are kept green—that the

memories of our heroic endeavor are kept fresh—and that the true story of our struggle is put upon the page of history and transmitted to coming generations. He believed that this would be done, and that as the heroes of the olden time have outlived the work of the chisel, and the story of Thermopylae and Marathon will live forever, so the deeds of our Confederate soldiers shall never die, and when the star of the Confederacy takes its place in the galaxy of history it will shine with increasing lustre as the years go on.

This imperfect report gives but a poor idea of General Lee's splendid effort which was rapturously received. He was greeted with three rousing cheers as he took his seat.

3. "*Our Infantry.*" General R. D. Lilley of Virginia made a facetious, appropriate and admirable response, which frequently brought down the house, while his empty sleeve was a silent but eloquent witness that he had done his duty.

4. "*Our Artillery.*" To respond to this toast the committee called out the Secretary of the Southern Historical Society, who at least succeeded in making the impression that he had a high opinion of Confederate soldiers in general and Confederate artillerymen in particular, and who cherishes a grateful remembrance of the kind reception given him by his old comrades.

5. "*Our Dead.*" Of course no one could have been more appropriately called on to respond to this toast than Rev. Dr. John Landstreet, one of those faithful chaplains who was ever at the post of duty, even though this sometimes required him to be in the thickest of the fight. He made an eloquent and every way admirable speech, and was enthusiastically applauded by his old comrades with whom he is evidently a great favorite.

In response to calls, General Bradley T. Johnson, General I. R. Trimble, General George H. Steuart, Hon. Spencer Jones, and others, made happy speeches, and the whole affair was a splendid success.

IN THE DEATH OF CAPTAIN JOHN HAMPDEN CHAMBERLAYNE, editor of the Richmond, Va., *State*, there has passed from our midst a gallant soldier, a chivalric gentleman, a pure patriot, an able editor, a fine scholar, a true friend, a noble man.

He was the friend of our University days, our comrade in the army, our co-worker in vindicating the truth of Confederate history, and we shall sadly miss his genial presence, kind encouragement, and trenchant pen.

He sleeps in beautiful Hollywood, amid orators, poets, statesmen, patriots, soldiers, and among them all there breathed no nobler, truer spirit, no more devoted son of the grand old Commonwealth he loved so well and served so faithfully.

Peace to his ashes!

RENEWALS are now very much in order, and we beg that each subscriber before laying this down will satisfy himself that if he owes his annual fee (\$3.00) the proper thing to do is to remit at once, and send along also at least one new subscriber.

THE FINANCIAL OUTLOOK of the Society seems to us brighter just now than for some time past. We owe nothing on account of current expenses, and we believe

that we shall, before long, be able to liquidate our old debt which has lapped over from '76, and raise enough for permanent endowment to place us on a firm basis. But in order to do this, *our friends must help us*. If you cannot join seven of our friends, who pledge \$100 each, or pay \$50 for a life membership, or give us \$25, or \$10, or \$5, as others have done, you can at least send us \$1 besides keeping up your subscription, and we beg you will do so *at once*.

GENERAL GEORGE D. JOHNSTON, of Alabama, we are most happy to announce, has again entered the service of the Society as our General Agent.

General Johnston is too well known as a gallant soldier, a genial companion, an accomplished speaker, and a high-toned Christian gentleman, to need any commendation from us.

And we are sure that we need not ask our old Confederates that they will help him in his work.

LITERARY NOTICES.

HISTORY OF THE TENTH MASSACHUSETTS BATTERY OF LIGHT ARTILLERY, 1862-1865. By JOHN D. BILLINGS. Boston: Hall & Whiting, Publishers. 1881.

This is a well gotten up book of four hundred pages, which tells in interesting style the story of a gallant battery which served with the Army of the Potomac. With few exceptions it seems to be written in a fair spirit, and to strive to do justice to the Confederates—albeit a little more careful study of our official reports and a little less reliance on McCabe's Lee as *Confederate authority*, would have helped the historic value of the book.

On the whole, we commend it as greatly superior to many similar publications. We are indebted to the courteous author for our copy.

THE PUBLISHERS—Charles Scribner's Sons, New York—have sent us the following additional volumes of their "Campaigns of the Civil War:—"

III. The Peninsula, by General Alexander S. Webb; IV. The Army under Pope, by John C. Ropes, Esq.; V. The Antietam and Fredericksburg, by General Francis Winthrop Palfrey; VI. Chancellorsville and Gettysburg, by General Abner Doubleday. Each 1 volume, 12mo, with Maps. Price, \$1.

We propose to give these volumes a careful study and a candid review, in which task we have been promised the aid of one of our ablest military critics. Meantime we may say that we have dipped into them sufficiently to see that they are of very unequal merit—the volumes by Mr. John C. Ropes and General Palfrey striking us as being greatly superior to the other two in the careful study they have given the campaigns of which they treat, and the fairness with which they have written. We commend all of these volumes as worth having, but expect to abundantly prove from them all that if Messrs. Charles Scribner's Sons really desire to present the whole truth they must also give our Confederate side a hearing. We could furnish them the names of twelve Confederates who would produce twelve companion volumes to this series which would very greatly add to its interest, accuracy and historic value.

